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Foreword
Digital Forensics and Born-Digital Content in Cultural Heritage Collections exam-
ines digital forensics and its relevance for contemporary research. The appli-
cability of digital forensics to archivists, curators, and others working within 
our cultural heritage is not necessarily intuitive. When the shared interests of 
digital forensics and responsibilities associated with securing and maintain-
ing our cultural legacy are identified—preservation, extraction, documenta-
tion, and interpretation, as this report details—the correspondence between 
these fields of study becomes logical and compelling. 
There is a palpable urgency to better understanding digital forensics as 
an important resource for the humanities. About 90 percent of our records 
today are born digital; with a similar surge in digital-based documentation 
in the humanities and digitally produced and versioned primary sources, in-
terpreting, preserving, tracing, and authenticating these sources requires the 
greatest degree of sophistication. 
This report makes many noteworthy observations. One is the porosity 
of our digital environment: there is little demarcation between various stor-
age methods, delivery mechanisms, and the machines with which we access, 
read, and interpret our sources. There is similarly a very thin line, if any, 
between the kind of digital information subject to forensic analysis and that 
of, for example, literary or historical studies. The data, the machines, and the 
methods are almost aggressively agnostic, which in turn allows for such ex-
traordinary and unprecedented interdisciplinarity. 
As this report notes, whether executing a forensic analysis of a suspected 
criminal’s hard drive or organizing and interpreting a Nobel laureate’s 
“papers,” we are tunneling through layer upon layer of abstraction. The more 
we can appreciate and respond to this new world of information, the more ef-
fective we will become in sustaining it and discovering new knowledge with-
in it. This requires not only a broader recognition of complementary work in 
what were once considered disparate or tangential fields of study, but also 
building new communities of shared interest and wider discourse.
    Charles Henry
    President
    Council on Library and Information Resources
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1. Introduction
Digital forensics is an applied field originating in law enforce-ment, computer security, and national defense. It is con-cerned with discovering, authenticating, and analyzing data 
in digital formats to the standard of admissibility in a legal setting. 
While its purview was once narrow and specialized (catching black-
hat hackers or white-collar cybercriminals), the increasing ubiquity 
of computers and electronic devices means that digital forensics is 
now employed in a wide variety of cases and circumstances. The 
floppy disk used to pinpoint the identity of the “BTK Killer” and 
the GPS device carried by the Washington, DC, sniper duo—both of 
which yielded critical trial evidence—are two high-profile examples. 
Digital forensics is also now routinely used in counter-terrorism and 
military intelligence.
While such activities may seem happily removed from the con-
cerns of the cultural heritage sector, the methods and tools devel-
oped by forensics experts represent a novel approach to key issues 
and challenges in the archives and curatorial community. Libraries, 
special collections, and other collecting institutions increasingly re-
ceive computer storage media (and sometimes entire computers) as 
part of their acquisition of “papers” from contemporary artists, writ-
ers, musicians, government officials, politicians, scholars, scientists, 
Fig. 1.1: An assortment of disks from 
the Ransom Center’s collection. 
Photographer: Pete Smith, Harry Ransom 
Center, The University of Texas at Austin.
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and other public figures. Smart phones, e-book readers, and other 
data-rich devices will surely follow. For governmental, corporate, 
and organizational repositories, meanwhile, the stakes are similar: 
ARMA International estimates that upwards of 90 percent of the re-
cords being created today are born digital (Dow 2009, xi).
The same forensics software that indexes a criminal suspect’s 
hard drive allows the archivist to prepare a comprehensive manifest 
of the electronic files a donor has turned over for accession; the same 
hardware that allows the forensics investigator to create an algorith-
mically authenticated “image” of a file system allows the archivist to 
ensure the integrity of digital content once captured from its source 
media; the same data-recovery procedures that allow the specialist to 
discover, recover, and present as trial evidence an “erased” file may 
allow a scholar to reconstruct a lost or inadvertently deleted version 
of an electronic manuscript—and do so with enough confidence to 
stake reputation and career. 
Digital forensics therefore offers archivists, as well as an ar-
chive’s patrons, new tools, new methodologies, and new capabilities. 
Yet as even this brief description must suggest, digital forensics does 
not affect archivists’ practices solely at the level of procedures and 
tools. Its methods and outcomes raise important legal, ethical, and 
hermeneutical questions about the nature of the cultural record, the 
boundaries between public and private knowledge, and the roles 
and responsibilities of donor, archivist, and the public in a new tech-
nological era.
1.1. Purpose and Audience 
The purpose of this report is twofold: first, to introduce the field of 
digital forensics to professionals in the cultural heritage sector; and 
second, to explore some particular points of convergence between 
the interests of those charged with collecting and maintaining born-
digital cultural heritage materials and those charged with collecting 
and maintaining legal evidence. A third purpose is implicit in the 
first two; namely, to serve as a catalyst for increased contact between 
expert personnel from these two seemingly disparate fields, thereby 
helping create more opportunities for knowledge exchange as well 
as, where appropriate, the development of shared research agendas. 
Given these objectives, the primary audience for this report is 
professionals in the cultural heritage sector charged with preserv-
ing and providing access to born-digital content in their collections, 
especially in manuscript collections and in archives. We also hope 
that the report will be of some interest to those in legal or industry 
settings, not least in terms of building awareness of additional con-
stituencies for their methods and tools. In fact, the distance between 
the two fields may be overstated. There are deep historical connec-
tions between the emergence of archival science and the Roman law 
of antiquity, founded on concepts such as chain of custody. (The fo-
rensics of modern evidentiary standards is etymologically rooted in 
the forensics of verbal disputation—“forensics” comes from the Latin 
forensis, “before the forum.”)
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Other possible audiences for this report include funders (who 
may be called upon to help implement the recommendations in sec-
tion 4.1), depositors, and dealers, who will likely play an increasing 
role in valuating and brokering born-digital materials. The role of 
the latter in particular should not be overlooked, since it seems likely 
that until there is a recognized marketplace for born-digital content, 
archives and collections will continue to acquire it in a more or less 
haphazard manner.
Finally, the report ought to be of interest to scholars whose re-
search necessitates the use of born-digital collections, and especially 
to textual scholars or to anyone interested in the technologies of 
documents or records and their storage and transmission. As high-
profile examples such as the Salman Rushdie digital papers at Emory 
University Libraries or the Stephen Jay Gould collection at Stanford 
University Libraries illustrate, any scholar working on topics in liter-
ary studies, cultural studies, art, music, film, theater, history, politics, 
or science from the 1980s forward will likely confront born-digital 
materials among her primary sources. Those scholars who lack well-
grounded knowledge of the technical makeup of these materials will 
risk unknowingly compromising or truncating their investigations. 
While portions of this report are necessarily technical, the archi-
vist who wishes to become a capable forensics practitioner will need 
to look elsewhere for formal education and training. We make no 
claim of having written a how-to guide or field manual. Under no 
circumstances should this report be regarded as sufficient preparation 
for anyone seeking to conduct a digital forensic investigation. Publi-
cations and resources for further study are listed in Appendix C.
1.2. Terminology and Scope
As Eoghan Casey notes, the term computer forensics is a “syntactical 
mess” that “uses the noun computer as an adjective and the adjective 
forensic as a noun” (2004, 31). Digital forensics, our term of choice, 
fares no better with regard to syntax but has become increasingly 
common and enjoys wider scope, encompassing devices that are not, 
strictly speaking, computers. Forensic computing is also sometimes 
proffered, but there the gerund presents its own issues for usage. 
Digital heritage forensics and digital records forensics have been sug-
gested by Duranti (2009). Casey himself favors digital evidence exami-
nation, but this seems too narrowly legalistic for our purposes. We 
have thus opted for digital forensics for the sake of its inclusivity and 
increasingly widespread recognition. (E-discovery is a neighboring 
term that refers to locating electronic evidence in civil litigation.)
Digital forensics breaks down into several subfields. Incident 
response is the branch of computer security and forensics that deals 
with the first responder on the scene of an actual crime or incident. 
This kind of fieldwork does have some relevance to the archivist, 
who may be charged with collecting computers and other hard-
ware or media from a remote site. Certain routine practices for the 
crime scene investigator, such as obtaining still-image and video 
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documentation, are useful in an archival context, where aspects of 
the computer’s original setting (e.g., Did the user work with a tan-
dem display?) might be relevant to later inquiries. Intrusion detec-
tion, meanwhile, is primarily the domain of systems administrators 
and security experts who work to counter active threats and collect 
evidence from compromised systems. Investigators working in intru-
sion detection are used to operating on “live” computers, meaning 
machines that are still turned on or connected to a network at the 
time of the expert’s intervention. This seems an unlikely scenario 
for an archivist, though in the future perhaps not too far afield for a 
records manager, and of course archives with online content must 
themselves guard against hostile network-based attacks. For the 
most part, however, the file system will be the premier locus of activ-
ity for a practitioner employing digital forensics in a cultural heritage 
setting. If a complete computer (as opposed to removable media) 
is involved, the machine can be assumed to be turned off when it 
comes into the archivist’s possession. File system forensics, as opposed 
to intrusion detection and incident response, will thus be our focus 
here. 
Finally, there are the emerging domains of Web and mobile fo-
rensics, driven by the recent and rapid rise of cloud computing and 
Web 2.0 services and mobile devices like smart phones and personal 
digital assistants (PDAs). Many high-profile individuals (writers, 
politicians, and others likely to become donors of personal papers) 
lead active online lives, participating in communities like Facebook, 
MySpace, Flickr, Google (and using applications like Google Docs), 
Twitter, and even virtual worlds like Second Life. E-mail may be 
stored locally, in the cloud, or both. The challenges here are legal as 
well as technical: different Web services are governed by different 
end-user license agreements, and too often these do not include pro-
visions for access even by family members or next of kin, let alone 
archivists. Remote backup providers like iDisk or Carbonite present 
the same issues. It is not difficult to foresee a time when hands-on 
access to a physical piece of media containing the data of interest 
will be the rarity for the archivist. Similarly, the growing popularity 
of smart phones, PDAs, tablet computers, and other devices with the 
potential to store all manner of information, including e-mail, text, 
video, voice messages, contacts, Web-browsing activity, and more, 
will present new challenges for the archivist in the not-too-distant 
future. Indeed, mobile forensics is already a major growth area in 
the commercial forensics industry and even in the consumer market, 
where readily available subscriber identity module (SIM) card read-
ers facilitate the recovery of deleted contacts and text messages. 
There are no absolute boundaries between the cloud and a local 
file system, or between mobile devices and a file system. Browser 
caches may reveal evidence of online activity, passwords for Web 
services may be discovered on local systems (or even on notes in 
the desk drawer next to them), and mobile devices may back up to 
a desktop or laptop computer—or the cloud. Future archivists will 
clearly need to contend with a fluid information ecology spanning all 
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current classes of devices and services. For the time being, however, 
especially as archivists contend with the legacy of the first several 
decades of personal computing, local file systems and removable me-
dia are likely to remain the primary venue for their work. Hence our 
focus here.
1.3. Background and Assumptions
Any field that concerns itself with the “preservation, identification, 
extraction, documentation, and interpretation” of recorded events 
would seem to require no special pleading for the attention of the 
archivist, scholar, or other steward of cultural heritage (Kruse and 
Heiser 2002, 2). Only the object of these activities—namely, digital 
data, which are seemingly abstract, numeric, or symbolic as opposed 
to embodied and material—could possibly raise questions of rel-
evance for the cultural heritage professional. In fact, however, digital 
forensics forces its practitioners to confront precisely the dual iden-
tity of digital data both as an abstract, symbolic entity and as material 
marks or traces indelibly inscribed in a medium. 
In the forensic sciences, the most relevant precedent for digital 
forensics is the field of questioned document examination, which 
dates to the end of the nineteenth century. Questioned document 
examination concerns itself with the physical evidence related to 
written and printed documents, especially handwriting attribution 
and the identification of forgeries. While digital data may seem vola-
tile and ephemeral, gone forever at the flip of a switch or madden-
ingly out of reach even if the device is in the palm of one’s hand, in 
fact stored data have a measurable physical presence in the world. 
Stored data are possessed of length and breadth, a fact that accounts 
for what is known as the areal density of a given piece of storage me-
dia—literally, how closely bits can be packed together on a discrete 
surface. (Advances in areal density are what explain the astonishing 
rise in the capacity of hard drives, outstripping even Moore’s law, 
which projects that the speed of microprocessors doubles every two 
years.) Currently, areal density on hard drives is upwards of 100 bil-
lion bits per square inch. Some scientists argue that we are approach-
ing the superparamagnetic limit, which is the point on the nanoscale 
at which the physical properties of magnetic material break down—
in other words, bits can only be made so small while retaining their 
physical properties. While digital forensics rarely descends to this 
microscopic level (despite the ubiquity of magnifying glasses hover-
ing over keyboards and hard drives in the field’s iconography) the 
inevitable physical residue of data, known as remanence, is the scien-
tific basis of all digital forensics techniques (see section 2.5.1). Even 
the contents of RAM memory may be subject to forensic recovery un-
der the proper conditions. In short, there is rarely any computation 
without some corresponding representation in a physical medium.
Digital forensics therefore belongs to the branch of forensic sci-
ence known as trace evidence, which owes its existence to the work 
of the French investigator Edmond Locard, whose famous exchange 
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principle may be glossed as follows: “A cross-transfer of evidence 
takes place whenever a criminal comes into contact with a victim, an 
object, or a crime scene” (Nickell and Fischer 1999, 10). Locard, a pro-
fessed admirer of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle who worked out of a po-
lice laboratory in Lyons until his death in 1966, pioneered the study 
of hair, fibers, soil, glass, paint, and other crime scene ephemera, pri-
marily through microscopic means. His life’s work is the cornerstone 
of the dictum that underlies contemporary forensic science: “Every 
contact leaves a trace.” As many malefactors have discovered, this is 
more, not less, true in the supposedly virtual confines of computer 
systems. Much hacker and cracker lore is given over to the problem 
of covering one’s “footsteps” when operating on a system uninvited; 
conversely, computer security often involves uncovering traces of 
suspicious activity inadvertently left behind in logs and system re-
cords. The 75-cent accounting error that starts off Clifford Stoll’s The 
Cuckoo’s Egg (1990), a best-selling account of true computer espio-
nage, is a classic example of Locard’s exchange principle in a digital 
setting.
Grasping the nature of the interaction between the physical and 
symbolic dimensions of computation is therefore essential to un-
derstanding digital data as trace evidence. A skilled investigator is 
able to leverage the features of the software operating system (OS) 
along with the physical properties of the machine’s storage media. 
But a comparison of digital evidence to hair, fibers, and paint chips 
will take us only so far. Specialists recognize that the characteristics 
of digital data are different from those of other forms of physical 
evidence, and these differences are significant for the archival prac-
titioner as well. As probative evidence, data are clearly vulnerable to 
being tampered with and manipulated. Chain of custody is therefore 
just as important as it is in the physical world, but investigators also 
employ cryptographic measures to guarantee the integrity of trial 
data. Here then is one of the central paradoxes of information in a 
digital form: the same symbolic regimen that makes it susceptible to 
undetectable manipulation also provides the means for mathemati-
cally ensuring its integrity.
Moreover, digital evidence is almost always partial or incom-
plete. An investigator may be able to recover only fragments of a file; 
a server log might capture some aspects of an event, but not others. 
This, too, is not unlike the nature of evidence in the physical world, 
but here we must remember that there is, finally, no direct access to 
data without mediation through complex instrumentation or layers 
of interpretative software. An investigator must constantly make 
sure that his or her data are not changed in the mere act of collection 
and analysis. Brian Carrier compares gaining access to a suspect’s 
computer with surveying a physical crime scene, and develops a 
comprehensive investigative model along just those lines. Crucially, 
he describes a computer as a doorway to a new room, or a “house 
where an investigator must look at thousands of objects” (Carrier 
and Spafford 2003, 2). The analogies seem particularly apt in the case 
of a magnetic hard disk, which is the default storage technology for 
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most contemporary systems: all manner of events, both monumental 
and mundane, are routinely committed to the hard disk, often with-
out a user’s knowledge or intervention. Computers today function 
as personal environments and extensions of self—we inhabit and 
customize our computers, and their desktops are the reflecting pool 
of our digital lives. The digital archivist, therefore, has much to learn 
from techniques that model the computer as a physical environment 
replete with potential evidence.
In preparing this report, we were struck again and again by the 
extent of the crossover between the archivist’s world and that of the 
modern forensic investigator. The same concepts appear—chain of 
custody, for example, or “de-duping” (removing duplicate items 
from a collection). Specific techniques in digital forensics such as 
digital stratigraphy, which entails reconstructing the layers and se-
quence of data deposited on a particular segment of media, often 
manifest explicit parallels to long-standing practices in bibliography 
and archival description. We maintain that such parallels are not 
coincidental, but rather evidence of something fundamental about 
the study of the material past, in whatever medium or form. As early 
as 1985, D. F. McKenzie, in his Panizzi lectures, explicitly placed 
electronic content within the purview of bibliography and textual 
criticism, saying, “I define ‘texts’ to include verbal, visual, oral, and 
numeric data, in the form of maps, prints, and music, of archives 
of recorded sound, of films, videos, and any computer-stored in-
formation, everything in fact from epigraphy to the latest forms of 
discography” (1999, 13). The significance of this formulation is not 
just its inclusivity or specific mention of digital data. The intellectual 
foundation of McKenzie’s entire career as a student of books in their 
physical form was a ruthless peeling away of the abstractions inher-
ent in bibliographical conjecture—mere “printers of the mind,” as the 
title of his most famous essay, an attack on key assumptions concern-
ing what was known about the printing of certain Shakespearean 
texts, has it—to the material particulars of what is essentially forensic 
inquiry (McKenzie 1969).
This peeling away of abstractions is the modus operandi of any 
digital forensics investigator. There is a fiction that computing is all 
about numbers, specifically ones and zeros. But there are no actual 
ones and zeros inside the case. We have, instead, layers of abstrac-
tion, from the pixels on the screen to the magnetic traces on the disk. 
Just because a particular user is identified as the owner of a certain 
file in its metadata, for example, is no guarantee that he or she is 
the individual who physically laid hands on keyboard to create it. 
To locate and leverage—artfully, but equitably—the tipping point 
at which evidence extrapolated from internal states of a computer 
operating system becomes associated beyond a reasonable doubt with 
actions and agents in the real, physical world is the essence of the fo-
rensic investigator’s challenge in the digital realm. Dan Farmer and 
Wietse Venema, two authorities in the field, put it this way: “As we 
peel away layer after layer of illusions, information becomes more 
and more accurate because it has undergone less and less processing. 
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But as we descend closer and closer toward the level of raw bits the 
information becomes less meaningful, because we know less and less 
about its purpose” (2005, 9).
In practical terms, this means we must learn to access and evalu-
ate multiple levels of the system in order to draw reliable conclusions 
about the data on a given piece of media. An incorrect system clock, 
for example, can render a file system’s date- and time-stamps unreli-
able. A knowledgeable observer could sometimes detect tampering 
on an old-fashioned automobile odometer on the basis of tell-tale 
signs such as a tendency for digits to “stick” at certain places; there 
is, however, nothing tangible to suggest that a computer’s internal 
clock has been rolled back or reset. This does not mean that an inves-
tigator with the proper training cannot evaluate evidence from the 
clock effectively, either to rule out or rule in the possibility of error 
or tampering. On UNIX-based systems, including the Mac OS, when 
a file is created it is assigned a unique identifier known as an inode 
number. File systems assign their inode numbers sequentially. Exam-
ining the inode numbers associated with a group of files—an activ-
ity performed from the UNIX command line—can reveal whether 
the numbers match the creation sequence suggested by the system’s 
date- and time-stamps. The point in this context is not the details 
of the procedure, but rather that peeling away one layer of abstrac-
tion (or “illusion” in Farmer and Venema’s more colorful language) 
brings us not to absolute truth but to a further layer of computational 
abstraction that we can leverage against the first in order to reach a 
more informed evaluation about the state of the digital materials in 
question. Both the forensic investigator and the cultural heritage pro-
fessional bear an important responsibility to avoid conjuring “users 
of the mind,” as it were.
The practice of digital forensics is a kind of four-way modulation 
between abstraction and individualization, and between volatility 
and stability. These are not merely intersecting oppositions: collec-
tively, they are the enabling conditions for computation in the tradi-
tion of a universal Turing machine. Farmer and Venema put it this 
way: “Volatility is an artifact of the abstractions that make computer 
systems useful” (2005, 12). To this we would add an observation 
about inscription and legible signs more generally: the alphabet, for 
example, by consolidating and abstracting earlier writing systems 
into a collection of some two dozen arbitrary symbols, simultane-
ously served to amplify the power of writing beyond measure and 
to open the door for error in many new guises. Whatever differences 
might exist in terms of the professional goals or societal function of 
an archivist or a scholar and a legal forensic specialist, they have in 
common the nature of their relationship to the unique inscriptive en-
vironment we call a computer.
1.4. Prior Work
The professional literature on digital forensics is vast (see Appen-
dix C), as is the literature on digital preservation and manuscript 
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archives.1 A comprehensive survey of either is beyond the scope of 
this report, so we limit ourselves here to reviewing only those prior 
efforts that specifically address points of convergence between the 
two fields.
The starting place for any cultural heritage professional inter-
ested in matters of forensics, data recovery, and storage formats is a 
1999 JISC/NIPO study coauthored by Seamus Ross and Ann Gow 
and entitled Digital Archaeology: Rescuing Neglected and Damaged Data 
Resources. Although more than a decade old, the report remains in-
valuable. In particular, the emphasis on recovery of data from obso-
lescent media is a welcome complement to much of the professional 
digital forensics literature, where the emphasis tends to be on con-
temporary systems and platforms (often the more cutting edge the 
better, as rival publishers vie to outdo one another for a share of the 
market). An archivist is as likely to be working with a Wang word 
processor as a Netbook or iPhone. Ross and Gow provide consider-
able detail on the physical properties of magnetic and optical storage 
media; they discuss emulation as a primary strategy for preserving 
access to migrated data as well as the experimental technique known 
as retargetable binary translation (RBT), an automated process for 
translating binary code from one platform, file format, and operat-
ing system to another; and they develop a number of case studies 
to demonstrate particular techniques in real-world situations. The 
report makes a sharp distinction between data recovery and data 
intelligibility; while it may be technically possible to recover pat-
terns of bits from magnetic media, by itself this is no guarantee of 
their legibility or usability. Ross and Gow also rightfully insist that 
“archivists, librarians, and information scientists need to extend their 
investigations of media and studies of its durability to the scientific 
journals where this material is published” (Ross and Gow 1999, 6).
Perhaps the first individual to recognize the deep linkage be-
tween the archival mind-set and digital forensics methodology was 
Elizabeth Diamond, writing in 1994. Diamond argues persuasively 
for the relevance of archival training to the work of historians, con-
structing an analogy to the role of forensic scientists in legal settings. 
Yet Diamond realizes that the relationship is more than just analogy. 
She places particular emphasis in this regard on electronic records 
as an emerging class of archival object in which descriptors such 
as “original” and “trustworthy” are problematic: “Archivists, like 
forensic scientists, become expert witnesses, testifying to the nature 
of documents. More and more often with electronic records . . . the 
archivist must ‘translate’ the records and be able to testify that they 
have not been tampered with or falsified” (Diamond 1994, 142). 
This research agenda has since been taken up by Luciana Du-
ranti and others who are developing new models for combining 
traditional diplomatics—the centuries-old practice of evaluating the 
fixity, integrity, and accuracy of analog and now digital records (see 
the sidebar on “Diplomatics”)—with digital forensics, resulting in 
1 Elizabeth H. Dow’s Electronic Records in the Manuscript Repository (2009) is a recent, 
convenient introduction to the latter subject.
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Diplomatics is a science that was developed in France in the seventeenth century by the Bene-dictine monk Dom Jean Mabillon in a treatise 
entitled De Re Diplomatica Libri VI (1681) for the purpose 
of ascertaining the provenance and authenticity of re-
cords that attested to patrimonial rights. It later grew 
into a legal, historical, and philological discipline as it 
came to be used by lawyers to resolve disputes, by his-
torians to interpret records, and by editors to publish 
medieval deeds and charters. Its name comes from the 
Latin word  diploma, which was used in ancient Rome to 
refer to documents written on two tablets attached with 
a hinge, and later to any recorded deed, and it means 
“about records.” However, over the centuries, the focus 
of diplomatics has expanded from its original concern 
with medieval deeds to an all-encompassing study of 
any document produced in the ordinary course of activ-
ity as a means for it and a residue of it.
It is useful to distinguish “classic diplomatics” from 
“modern diplomatics,” because these two branches of 
the discipline do not represent a natural evolution of the 
latter from the former, but exist in parallel and focus on 
different objects of study. Classic diplomatics uses the 
concepts and methodologies developed by diplomatists 
living between the seventeenth and the twentieth cen-
turies, and studies medieval charters, instruments, and 
deeds. Modern diplomatics has adapted, elaborated, 
and developed the core concepts and methodology of 
classic diplomatics to study modern and contemporary 
records of all types. Classic diplomatics studies only 
documents that are meant to have legal consequences 
and therefore requires specific documentary forms; it 
is defined as the knowledge of the formal rules that ap-
ply to legal records. Modern diplomatics has a broader 
scope; it is concerned with all documents that are cre-
ated in the course of affairs of any kind, and is defined 
as “the discipline which studies the genesis, forms, and 
transmission” of records, and “their relationship with 
the facts represented in them and with their creator, in 
order to identify, evaluate, and communicate their true 
nature” (Duranti 1998, 45). 
The primary focus of both classic and modern diplo-
matics is to assess the trustworthiness of records; how-
ever, the former establishes it retrospectively, looking 
at records issued several centuries ago, while the latter 
is concerned not only with establishing the trustwor-
thiness of existing records but also with ensuring the 
trustworthiness of records that have yet to be created. 
Additionally, classic diplomatics identifies trustworthi-
ness solely with authenticity, while modern diplomatics 
distinguishes several aspects of trustworthiness. For 
classic diplomatics, “trustworthy” records are authen-
tic records, that is, documents written according to the 
practice of the time and place indicated in the text, and 
signed with the name(s) of the person(s) competent to 
create them. Modern diplomatics concerns itself with 
four aspects of trustworthiness: reliability, authenticity, 
accuracy, and authentication.
Diplomatics regards the documentary world as a sys-
tem and uses a parallel system to understand and ex-
plain it. Classic diplomatists rationalized, formalized, 
and universalized the creation of a document identify-
ing its relevant elements, extending their relevance in 
time and space, eliminating their particularities, and re-
lating those elements to each other and to their ultimate 
purpose. These elements are building blocks that have 
an inherent order and can be analyzed in sequence from 
the general to the specific, following a natural method 
of inquiry. The building blocks used by classic diploma-
tists were: (1) the juridical system, which is the context 
of records creation; (2) the act, which is the reason for 
records creation; (3) the persons, which are the agents; 
(4) the procedures, which guide the actions and deter-
mine their documentary residue; and (5) the documen-
tary form, which reflects the act and allows it to reach 
its purpose. To these five blocks, modern diplomatics 
has added a sixth: the archival bond. The concept of ar-
chival bond is unknown to classic diplomatics because 
of its focus on medieval records, the main characteristic 
of which was the fact that each incorporated the entire 
act as carried out through the acting procedure and the 
subsequent documentary procedure. The focus of mod-
ern diplomatics on modern records meant that one of 
its main concerns had to be the interrelationship that 
each modern record has with the previous and subse-
quent records that participate in the same act and/or 
integrated business and documentary procedure. This 
interrelationship, following archival theory, was called 
the archival bond by modern diplomatists, and was con-
figured as an incremental network of relationships that 
links all the records of the same file and/or same series, 
and the same archival fonds. 
This system of building blocks is used to carry out the 
analysis of the records under examination. The structure 
of diplomatic analysis, or criticism, as it is called by clas-
sic diplomatists, is rigorous and systematic, and may 
proceed from the general to the specific or vice versa, 
depending on the available information. The early di-
plomatists first separated the record from the world and 
Diplomatics
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what Duranti terms a “digital records forensics.” She offers an over-
view in a recent article “From Digital Diplomatics to Digital Records 
Forensics” (2009), emphasizing that the classification of a digital ob-
ject as a “record” has implications for its admissibility as courtroom 
evidence. The piece has value beyond this technical discussion, how-
ever, particularly insofar as it serves as an introduction both to diplo-
matics and to digital forensics more generally, and makes a number 
of points about the special nature of records, as well as of other 
kinds of documents, in digital settings. This work is developed and 
extended at both the theoretical and practical levels in the research 
of the InterPARES (International Research on Permanent Authentic 
Records in Electronic Systems) Project, which has been funded by 
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada’s 
Community-University Research Alliances under Duranti’s direction 
in three phases since 1999. Case studies for the research have ranged 
from government records to the visual and performing arts. (The 
third phase of InterPARES, set to conclude in 2012, focuses on the 
implementation of findings from the first two, paving the way for a 
comprehensive legal, archival, and technical framework for the man-
agement and evaluation of electronic records.) Meanwhile, Duranti’s 
Digital Records Forensics Project involves researchers at the Univer-
sity of British Columbia in a collaboration with the Vancouver Police 
Department, taking as one of its principal objectives development 
of “the theoretical and methodological content of a new discipline, 
called ‘Digital Records Forensics,’ resulting from an integration of 
Archival Diplomatics, Computer Forensics and the Law of Evidence 
with the project’s newly developed knowledge.”2
Many who have worked with born-digital materials in library 
and archival settings are familiar with the pioneering efforts of Jere-
my Leighton John and the Digital Lives project at the British Library.3 
John was among the first to transfer techniques from digital forensics 
to his work recovering and archiving personal papers in a variety of 
computer formats and media. He has given numerous presentations 
2 See http://www.digitalrecordsforensics.org/. 
3 See http://www.bl.uk/digital-lives/. 
establishing the meaning of the phenomenon under in-
vestigation, thereby making possible the understanding 
of unprecedented manifestations of records, the assess-
ment of the trustworthiness of records that come to us 
at the end of several reproduction processes, and the 
identification of what needs to be protected and of how 
to ensure that a trace of our actions will be carried into 
the future. Thus, it can be considered the oldest form of 
records forensics.
—Luciana Duranti, University of British Columbia
then put the two into relation, trying to understand the 
world through the record. Thus, they began analyzing 
the formal elements of the records and, from the results 
of such analysis, reached conclusions about procedures, 
persons, acts, and contexts. They firmly believed in the 
possibility of discovering a consistent, underlying truth 
about the nature of a record and of the act producing it 
through the use of a scientific method for analyzing its 
various components.
Indeed, diplomatics enables record professionals to 
work with a heuristic device, a diagnostic tool for 
Diplomatics continued from prior page
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on the topic, and the Digital Lives project’s recently published final 
report offers extensive coverage of issues around personal digital 
archives and records, including several sections describing the role of 
forensics in their acquisition and management (John et al. 2010). The 
report concludes that authentication of electronic records and objects 
is a key application for digital forensics in archives, specifically with 
regard to the interpretation of date- and time-stamps, the capacity 
to capture authentic digital copies of the materials, and the ability 
to extract significant metadata from the original file system. John 
acknowledges the importance of informed consent by the donor as a 
prerequisite for forensic processing, and suggests the potential value 
of forensic tools to scholarly research through their ability to ascer-
tain revision histories and other details about a document’s composi-
tion. Finally, John underscores the role of forensic methods and tools 
in identifying forgeries, a seemingly inevitable fact of digital life.
The Bodleian Libraries, meanwhile, have been doing what are 
likely the most comprehensive studies to date on workflow for 
acquiring, processing, and making available personal papers in a 
variety of digital formats. The Workbook on Digital Private Papers pro-
duced by the Bodleian’s Paradigm project remains the closest thing 
the archives community has to a textbook on the subject. The Para-
digm Workbook, however, addresses digital forensics only in passing. 
Forensics is within the scope of the Bodleian’s futureArch (Future of 
Archives) project (more detail is available in the sidebar on “Digital 
Forensics at the Bodleian Libraries”). The Digital Preservation Work-
flow Project (Prometheus) at the National Library of Australia is 
similarly engaged, with particular emphasis on creating scalable and 
reliable practices for the transfer of data from legacy storage media 
to contemporary repository systems. Stanford University Libraries, 
a partner (with the University of Virginia, Yale University, and Hull 
University) in the Mellon-funded AIMS (An Inter-institutional Model 
for Stewardship) project on digital papers, has acquired two forensic 
computing workstations for use with its collection processing, and 
maintains an active blog on the subject (more detail is available in the 
sidebar on p.30).4 As of this writing, AIMS is still in an early stage. 
Finally, the PERPOS project, led by Bill Underwood at Georgia Tech, 
has been investigating issues related to electronic records manage-
ment in the specific domain of the Presidential Records Act, and has 
leveraged approaches from computational linguistics and digital fo-
rensics, the latter in the area of file-format identification.
The file system and format researcher who has had the most con-
tact to date with the cultural heritage community is Simson Garfinkel 
of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, who has 
published a number of papers of relevance to archives and digital 
personal papers.5
4 See https://lib.stanford.edu/digital-forensics for the Stanford University Libraries 
forensics blog and http://born-digital-archives.blogspot.com/ for the AIMS project 
blog.
5 Many of these are available from Garfinkel’s home page at http://simson.net/page/
Main_Page. 
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Matthew Kirschenbaum, a coauthor of this report, has com-
mented on digital forensics, textual scholarship, and the materiality 
of born-digital objects in his monograph Mechanisms: New Media and 
the Forensic Imagination (2008). In particular, Kirschenbaum argues 
that insights from digital forensics serve as a counterweight to many 
commonplace assumptions about electronic data, namely, their un-
qualified ephemerality, volatility, and malleability. Kirschenbaum et 
al. also note the promise of forensics in the white paper “Approaches 
to Managing and Collecting Born-Digital Literary Materials for 
Scholarly Use” (2009), prepared with support from the National En-
dowment for the Humanities. 
Finally, History and Electronic Artefacts is a prescient book edited 
by Edward Higgs (1998) containing several contributions (Seamus 
Ross, R. J. Morris, Ronald Zweig, Doron Swade) that seemingly set 
the stage for the application of forensics in electronic cultural records 
and archives—such as when R. J. Morris predicts in his chapter that 
“much will be lost, but even when disks become unreadable, they 
may well contain information which is ultimately recoverable. With-
in the next ten years, a small and elite band of e-paleographers will 
emerge who will recover data signal by signal” (33). For an epigraph, 
we could do worse than this last.
1.5. About This Report
The authors undertook research and writing for this report in 2009–
2010, with advice and assistance from Duranti, Glisson, Lee, Max-
well, Reside, and Thomas. In May 2010, a symposium was convened 
at the University of Maryland to solicit feedback and comment on 
a first draft of the report from a community of practitioners. Details 
related to the meeting’s agenda and attendees, as well as a recap of 
its proceedings, can be found in Appendix D. Following the meet-
ing, the authors and consultants produced a final draft of the report, 
which they submitted in September to the Council on Library and 
Information Resources (CLIR) for copyediting and publication. The 
authors presented overviews of the report at the Digital Lives project 
seminar at the British Library and at the annual partners meeting 
of the National Digital Information Infrastructure and Preservation 
Program, both in July 2010. These presentations constituted further 
occasions for feedback. 
Section 1 of the report describes its purpose and audience, ex-
plains decisions regarding terminology and scope, provides details 
on the process by which this document was researched and written, 
and acknowledges our sources of support. It also selectively reviews 
relevant literature and articulates some of the issues and ideas that 
form the assumptions for the work that follows. 
Section 2 is organized topically. It covers challenges such as 
legacy formats, unique and irreplaceable data, trustworthiness, au-
thenticity, data recovery, and costing forensic work. 
Section 3 considers the ethical issues that arise with forensics 
and their effect on archivists’ relationships with current and potential 
donors. 
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Section 4 offers recommendations to the scholarly and archives 
communities in terms of their current and near-future engagement 
with digital forensics, as well as suggestions for establishing and 
maintaining communication between the cultural heritage sector and 
legal or government practitioners. 
Independently authored sidebars throughout serve to amplify 
and extend selected topics apart from the main body of the report.
Appendixes A and B offer surveys of forensic software and hard-
ware, respectively. Appendix C offers recommendations for further 
reading and study, and Appendix D summarizes the proceedings of 
the May 2010 meeting at the University of Maryland.
Mention of specific products or vendors, either in the body of 
this report or its appendixes, does not constitute endorsement by 
the authors or consultants, their institutions, The Andrew W. Mellon 
Foundation, or CLIR, and none of the preceding individuals and or-
ganizations may be held accountable for damages caused by the use 
of products and procedures discussed herein.
2. Challenges
Born-digital materials present challenges as multifarious as the items 
themselves. Issues ranging from how to identify and capture digital 
cultural heritage (and the related ethical concerns); to technical ques-
tions related to data integrity, accessibility, and recovery; to concerns 
about the cost of digital preservation projects are among the chal-
lenges that archivists, curators, and others concerned with preserv-
ing born-digital cultural heritage materials must confront. The fol-
lowing sections examine these and other issues in detail and discuss 
the benefits and drawbacks of inserting digital forensics methods 
into an archival workflow.
2.1. Legacy Formats
The digital media received by archival repositories often contain a 
combination of legacy and contemporary formats.6 Because comput-
ers and external data-storage devices obsolesce at several levels (file 
format, file system, operating system, application, and hardware 
and media), an archivist must consider a variety of factors when 
developing strategies to preserve and provide access to the files on 
these media. Finding the hardware necessary to access older media is 
among the first steps, followed closely by identifying the wide range 
of operating and file systems these media contain and deciding on 
the best way to make the files accessible to researchers. This section 
focuses on historical, or legacy, media and the challenges they pose 
for digital preservation, as well as on the ways in which incorporat-
ing forensic techniques at certain points in the archival workflow can 
6 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “legacy” in the context of computing as 
“designating software or hardware which, although outdated or limiting, is an 
integral part of a computer system and difficult to replace.” Available at http://
dictionary.oed.com/ (accessed 28 January 2010).
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help make the capture and identification of legacy materials more 
efficient and secure.7 
2.1.1.	 File	System
The file system controls how files are organized, named, described, 
and retrieved, which means that it is important not only in relation 
to the files themselves but also to their metadata.8 Like hardware 
and operating systems, file systems continue to evolve. Because file 
systems dictate different file parameters, the files created in one sys-
tem often differ in substantive ways from those created in another. 
For example, file names in some of the earlier Microsoft file systems 
(e.g., File Allocation Table [FAT] 12 and 16) were limited to eight 
characters, whereas later systems have limits between 254 and 256 
characters. Another difference is the type of characters allowed in 
directory and file names. The Macintosh Hierarchical File System 
(HFS), for example, allows everything except : whereas the Windows 
New Technology File System (NTFS) restricts the characters / \ and 
: in addition to others. Similarly, some operating systems restrict the 
use of certain characters across all file systems: for example, DOS, 
Windows, and OS/2 prohibit the characters \ / : ? “ > < and * among 
others, in file and directory names. 
These differences between file systems underscore the inter-
play between personal practice and the parameters dictated by 
any particular computing system. In other words, the limitations 
and affordances of a particular file system have an effect on how a 
creator organizes and names the files—establishes a personal filing 
system—on her computer. Creators operate within the confines of 
their computing systems, yet make important and personal choices 
from within these imposed structures. As important expressions of a 
creator’s naming and organizational conventions, and as reflections 
of the computing environment within which they were created, file 
and directory names and the characters that constitute them should 
be preserved unaltered.
File-system differences can become problematic for archivists 
working to capture files from original media. For example, an archi-
vist will get an error message if she tries to copy an older Mac file 
with / in the file name from an original disk or computer to a Win-
dows-formatted external hard drive that does not allow that particu-
lar character. File systems also have parameters dictating what size 
file can be copied. For example, an external hard drive formatted as 
FAT 32 only accepts files smaller than 4 gigabytes (GB). Consider the 
following scenario: an archivist uses the dd (“disk dump”) utility to 
create a disk image of an entire hard drive from a modern computer. 
7 Some forensic software packages include functions that can be performed just as 
easily by stand-alone tools. For example, a freeware hex editor could be used to 
identify file type and glean other sorts of information. For more on the uses of hex 
editors, see section 2.5.
8 For an informative overview and links to additional resources, see the Wikipedia 
entry for “File system” at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_system (accessed 29 
January 2010). For a more in-depth explanation of file systems, see Carrier 2005, 
especially chapters 8 through 17.
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A Digital Forensics Workflow
A generic digital forensics workflow consists of the following decisions and actions (Glisson 2009). First, one must decide where to store 
the information. To ensure that data remanence does 
not contaminate the information stored on the target 
drive, the target drive needs to be forensically cleaned. 
This entails wiping the target drive by writing all ze-
ros or ones to it. However, the 2006 National Industry 
Security Program Operating Manual (also referred to 
as the DOD 5220.22-M) does not specify the number 
of passes required to achieve sanitation (Department 
of Defense 2006). Even though there is some disagree-
ment regarding the effectiveness of overwriting for 
sanitation purposes, it is a good idea from a forensic 
practice perspective.
The second step is to document the hardware, includ-
ing serial numbers and manufacturer information. 
The third step is to start the chain of custody and to 
transport the device to a secure lab for processing.
At this point, a bit stream copy of the removable me-
dia should be made by creating either a clone or a fo-
rensic image of the device. Write-blocking hardware 
or software should be employed to prevent inadver-
tent alteration of the original media during the copy-
ing. All write-blocking solutions should be tested and 
documented prior to implementation. A bit stream 
copy of the removable media copies every bit on the 
source drive (Nelson et al. 2008). Once a bit stream 
copy has been saved to another drive, i.e., the target 
drive, so that the target drive is bootable, it is com-
monly referred to as a clone. This is generally done 
using a drive that is physically identical to the source. 
When the bit stream copy is saved to an image file, it 
is commonly referred to as a forensic image. It is pos-
sible to take a forensic image and restore the image 
to a drive, making a clone of the source drive. At this 
point, the forensic copy of the removable media needs 
to be authenticated. This is typically done through the 
execution of a one-way hash on both devices to verify 
that they are identical. 
The next issue to address is the file system. It can be 
argued that the file system is part of the application 
layer, the presentation layer, and the session layer as 
defined in the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
seven-layer model (SearchNetworking.com). The file 
system is responsible for the organization of the files, 
i.e., it is responsible for the logical placement of the 
files on the storage drive. Hence, the file system is 
manipulating the sectors on a drive so that they are 
treated as clusters. These clusters are then linked, as 
needed, so that they can be treated as a file with as-
sociated metadata. The size of the clusters will vary 
depending on the size of the hard disk drive and the 
file system (Nelson et al. 2008). Understanding this in-
teraction is critical to the retrieval of data that have 
been accidentally or intentionally deleted on various 
types of files systems like the File Allocation Table 
(FAT) system, New Technology File System (NTFS), 
High-Performance File System (HPFS), or Hierarchi-
cal File System (HFS). 
The next step is to analyze the drive to identify ac-
tive files and inactive files. Active files are readily 
identifiable and can be accessed with the appropriate 
software and, in some cases, the required security in-
formation. Inactive files can be located by carving the 
unallocated space and slack space off of the drive. Un-
allocated space is space that has not been used by the 
file system. It can contain deleted files as well. Infor-
mation can also be found in two types of unallocated 
slack space: file slack and RAM slack (sometimes both 
are referred to as drive slack) (Nelson et al. 2008). Any 
anomalies that are identified, such as encrypted in-
formation, proprietary software formats, and missing 
partitions, are noted and examined individually. All 
information found is documented appropriately.
This detailed documentation includes all the issues 
that were encountered and the evidence that was dis-
covered in the process. It also includes the methods 
used in the investigation, along with citations sup-
porting the analysts’ stated opinions. The detailed re-
ports are then passed to the appropriate legal parties 
or agencies for examination.
–Brad Glisson, University of Glasgow, 
and Rob Maxwell, University of Maryland
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The resulting image is 9 GB. The next step in the archivist’s proce-
dure is to use a flash drive to transfer that 9 GB file to the external 
hard drive used to house the repository’s preservation master copies. 
She connects the flash drive, copies the file, and attempts to paste it 
into the flash drive’s window, but an error message notifies her that 
the file is too large to be copied. The flash drive has a capacity of 
32 GB, which is more than enough to accommodate the image file, 
so size should not be an issue; however, because the flash drive’s file 
system is FAT 32, it only accepts files smaller than 4 GB.
These and related systems challenges will persist as new devices 
and strategies for storing data—for example, mobile devices, flash 
drives, and solid-state drives—emerge with technology to manage 
their contents. The file systems mentioned above were developed 
primarily for use on hard drives, although, like the flash drive in the 
previous example, there are also FAT-formatted media. Several other 
file systems have been developed for specific uses or media, such as 
ISO 9660 (including an extension for multisession CDs) and Univer-
sal Disk Format (UDF) for optical media; and ZFS, NTFS with En-
crypting File System (Windows), and eCryptfs (Linux) for encrypted 
file systems. Each has unique characteristics that may need to be 
taken into account when capturing the contents of media and mak-
ing choices about storage configuration. 
The use of forensic technology to capture original bit copies has 
the potential to lessen the impact of file-system differences, at least 
in the initial stages of long-term preservation. To a certain degree, 
the disk image format may serve as a buffer between the file system 
of the storage environment in which the image is saved and the in-
dividual files within the image. For example, the individual files on 
a FAT-12 disk will be named according to the idiosyncrasies of that 
file system, which might not be compatible with the file system of a 
modern flash drive, external hard drive, or server (i.e., a repository’s 
storage environment). But when a repository images that disk, the 
contents become part of a more complex directory structure. The out-
er layer of the structure consists of the disk image format; inside are 
the original FAT-12-formatted files. Because these files are contained 
within an image file, the file system of the storage device will interact 
with that image file rather than with the FAT-12-formatted files with-
in. Ideally, this image file will be named according to a repository’s 
conventions and will not include potentially problematic characters. 
As individual files and groupings of files are carved from disk im-
ages for processing (see section 2.5.3), the impact of file-system speci-
fications on naming and organizational practices will likely resurface 
and influence the methods archivists use to discern and preserve 
them, and to store these files. 
2.1.2.	Operating	System	and	Application
Legacy software, including operating systems, presents preservation 
challenges similar to those described above; namely, how to identify 
the application used to create a particular file, and then formulate a 
preservation strategy that does not risk fundamentally altering the 
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file’s characteristics. A computer’s OS facilitates interaction between 
the user and the underlying chip set as well as peripheral devices, 
and is also the basic environment, or host, for software applications. 
Software is often OS-specific; in other words, a version of a program 
designed for Mac OS cannot be successfully installed on a Windows 
machine, and vice versa. Similarly, software designed for an older 
operating system may not run its contemporary counterpart, which 
in turn means that files created using the software native to these 
older systems might not be accessible on current computers. For 
example, a word processing document created in Windows 3.1 or 
Mac System 7.5 might not open with a modern office suite installed 
on Windows 7 or OSX. And even if software is designed to be back-
wardly compatible, the final consumer product may not fulfill this 
promise. These compatibility problems arise, in part, from the differ-
ent file systems supported by each OS. To access individual files and 
groupings of files (e.g., database, container) in their native formats, it 
is necessary to have a machine with an OS and application capable of 
reading the data the medium holds.9
Metadata harvesters (e.g., National Library of New Zealand 
[NLNZ] Metadata Extraction Tool) and batch-identification tools 
(e.g., Digital Record Object Identification [DROID]) can be used in 
conjunction with file registries such as PRONOM and the Global 
Digital Format Registry (GDFR) Project to identify file formats 
and learn more about their specifications.10 Some tools, such as the 
JSTOR/Harvard Object Validation Environment (JHOVE), include 
automatic file-format-identification capabilities.11 Forensic software 
such as the Forensic ToolKit (FTK), EnCase Forensic, and open-
source alternatives such as The Sleuth Kit (see Appendix A for more 
detail) can also help automate the analysis of born-digital materials. 
They can extract and record metadata about file type, file dates, file 
size, and the relationships among files in a hierarchy, as well as other 
information. The ability of these tools to analyze data throughout a 
disk image will make it easier for archivists to locate all the files in 
a given format. For example, if analysis indicates that all the text on 
9 Alternatively, if a repository does not have access to legacy software or the means 
or technical knowledge to run emulated platforms, a conversion tool (e.g., ABC 
Amber Text Converter) could be used to transfer certain file types into other, more 
broadly legible file types that could be searched or skimmed to ascertain the content. 
OpenOffice, an open-source, freeware alternative to Microsoft Word, is also able to 
read files created in a wide range of legacy proprietary software formats. For a list 
of the formats OpenOffice can open, see the File Formats page of the OpenOffice.org 
Wiki, available at http://wiki.services.openoffice.org/wiki/Documentation/OOo3_
User_Guides/Getting_Started/File_formats (accessed 18 August 2010). 
10 To learn more about the NLNZ Metadata Extractor, see http://www.natlib.govt.
nz/services/get-advice/digital-libraries/metadata-extraction-tool (accessed 24 
April 2010). To find out more about DROID, see http://freshmeat.net/projects/
droid (accessed 24 April 2010). And for more about PRONOM and the Global Digital 
Format Registry Project (GDFR), which are in the process of combining to form the 
Unified Digital Formats Registry (UDFR), see http://www.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/aboutapps/PRONOM/tools.htm (PRONOM, accessed 30 January 2010); http://
www.gdfr.info (GDFR, accessed 11 August 2010); and http://www.udfr.org (UDFR, 
accessed 11 August 2010). 
11 For more about JHOVE, see http://hul.harvard.edu/jhove/ (accessed 30 January 
2010).
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a disk was created using WordPerfect 7, and the repository already 
has that particular software, it might be more cost-effective and ef-
ficient for the archivist to process that disk rather than one with files 
that would require purchasing additional software to access. Digital 
archivists can use information generated by forensic tools to make 
informed decisions about how best to preserve files for the long term 
and what time frame is realistic for providing patrons with access to 
the materials. 
2.1.3.	Hardware
Hardware can arrive at a repository in a variety of ways, and ac-
quisitions increasingly include intact computers as well as exter-
nal data-storage devices such as disks, cartridges, compact discs, 
memory cards, and flash drives. To capture files from legacy disks 
and other storage media, an archivist needs access to a workstation 
with compatible drives and ports (e.g., 5.25-inch floppy drive, DB-9 
or DB-25 connectors—see the sidebar on “Rosetta Computers”). Sev-
eral companies and organizations have developed external floppy 
drives, adapters, and controllers that can be connected to a modern 
computer via a USB port or that plug directly into existing floppy 
disk connectors.12 These may provide a cheaper access alternative for 
repositories without the resources to invest in a full forensic work-
station or those that want to give priority to capturing files from 
12 Examples include D Bit’s FDADAP board, which adapts 8-inch floppy drives to 
work with 3.5- and 5.25-inch connectors (www.dbit.com/fdadap.html), Device Side 
Data’s USB 5.25-inch Floppy Controller (http://shop.deviceside.com/), and the 
external USB 3.5-inch floppy drives offered by a variety of companies online (all 
accessed 11 August 2010). Jeremy Leighton John mentions additional tools in his 
article “Adapting Existing Technologies for Digital Archiving Personal Lives: Digital 
Forensics, Ancestral Computing, and Evolutionary Perspectives and Tools” (2008).
Fig. 2.1: Laptops in the Ransom Center’s 
collection. Photographer: Gabriela 
Redwine, Harry Ransom Center, The 
University of Texas at Austin.
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Migration of data from obsolete media formats is one of the most difficult problems in digital fo-rensics. Although a clever developer can write 
emulators to migrate data from a disk image, physically 
connecting a device capable of reading an obsolete me-
dia format requires not only rare software expertise (to 
write drivers) but also expertise in electrical engineering 
and access to materials that may be difficult to obtain. It 
is, for instance, somewhat difficult to migrate data from 
a 5.25-inch Commodore 64 disk, but because the media 
fit physically into drives that were used by most major 
computer manufacturers and that operated in roughly 
the same way, there are now several ways to migrate 
data from these disks to modern PCs. A Commodore 
64 data cartridge, on the other hand, is much harder to 
image, largely because making a physical connection be-
tween the cartridge and, say, a 2010 MacBook Pro would 
require an array of custom-built hardware.
In the future, there may emerge a class of archival tech-
nologists whose role it is to construct such hardware. 
Enterprising hobbyists have already built devices (such 
as the unfortunately named Catweasel or the even less 
mellifluous FD5025 card) for reading 5.25-inch floppy 
drives with twenty-first-century machines. Similar ef-
forts will likely keep USB devices and the magnetic, ro-
tating hard drive usable long after they vanish from con-
sumer machines. However, historically there has been a 
significant lag between the time that a device becomes 
difficult to find and the commercial availability of cus-
tom-built bridging devices. In the interim, some of the 
most useful tools for migrating data from an obsolete to 
a modern (or at least slightly less obsolete) format are 
those computers that were manufactured at a moment 
when a popular new media format or transfer protocol 
had just emerged. Such computers often have ports or 
drives, along with associated drivers, capable of using 
older, and in their time more common, technologies as 
well as new ones. I call these liminal computers “Roset-
ta machines” because, like their namesake, the Rosetta 
Stone, they provide a translation aid for those wishing to 
transfer information from one encoding to another.
Examples of recent Rosetta machines are those that 
include readers for the multitude of flash media cards 
that were developed between 2000 and 2010 (Com-
pact Flash, Sony Memory Sticks, Secure Digital, etc.) 
and machines that have DB-25 parallel ports and RS-
232 serial ports in addition to USB ports. Earlier, and 
now very valuable, examples include machines that can 
read both 5.25-inch and 3.5-inch floppies, and Macin-
tosh computers with “super disk drives” that can read 
both 800K and 1.4Mb floppies. The Rosetta machine par 
excellence, however, is the Macintosh Wallstreet Pow-
erbook G3. The laptop, manufactured between May 
and September 19981, came with swappable CD, DVD, 
and floppy drives capable of reading 800K and 400K 
disks. A swappable Zip drive could be purchased for 
the machine, an Ethernet port allowed data to be trans-
ferred from the computer using standard networking 
protocols, and PCMCIA slots permitted the addition of 
USB ports through a third-party card to which an exter-
nal hard drive, or even flash media, could be attached. 
The hardware is capable of supporting older versions 
of Linux, and with it many contemporary open-source 
software packages. The machine does not natively sup-
port 5.25-inch floppies or other more archaic formats, 
but it does serve as an example of the sorts of machines 
that may prove valuable to digital preservation labora-
tories in the future.
Obtaining and maintaining Rosetta machines such as the 
Macintosh Wallstreet Powerbook G3 will be a challenge 
for future archivists. Today, such machines are most eas-
ily found on eBay, Craigslist, and other online advertis-
ing and auction sites; these sites and their future analogs 
will likely continue to be invaluable to archivists. 
Once obtained, these aging machines must be kept in 
working order. For this reason, it is probably wise for 
major repositories to employ electrical engineers capa-
ble of servicing a wide range of devices (just as chemists 
and mechanics are regularly employed to preserve pa-
per and magnetic media). However, since in most cases 
Rosetta machines are a stopgap measure—a relatively 
inexpensive way of accessing old media until replace-
ment technology (such as the Kryoflux) is developed—
long-term investment in any one Rosetta device is prob-
ably unnecessary. In most cases, it may be cheaper to 
turn to eBay for a replacement rather than to devote vast 
resources to maintaining idiosyncratic hardware.
—Doug Reside, University of Maryland 
1 http://lowendmac.com/pb2/wallstreet-powerbook-g3-i.
html (accessed 8 September 2010).
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only one media format (e.g., 3.5-inch disks). Even a preconfigured 
forensic workstation (e.g., Forensic Recovery of Evidence Device 
[FRED] by Digital Intelligence) may need to be customized to in-
clude older drives. Regardless of whether a processing workstation 
is constructed locally or purchased preconfigured, write protection 
is a necessary element. This can be as simple as flipping the write-
protect tab on a 3.5-inch disk, using the command line to configure 
the workstation’s floppy drive as read-only, or purchasing a write 
blocker, a device engineered to prevent data transfer to a given piece 
of source media.
With a computer, a repository potentially receives a complete 
physical environment: data files, at least some of the software neces-
sary to read them, and contextual information at the systems level 
that can be helpful in learning more about the contents, the person 
who created them, and her working practices. In one sense, the en-
vironment is “complete,” in that by the time the machine reaches a 
repository, the creator has finished with it. In another sense, how-
ever, it is no more possible to capture a complete computing environ-
ment than it is to transfer or acquire a complete paper-based archive. 
The materials a repository receives tell only a partial story. Included 
among each shoebox of letters, sheaf of manuscript pages, or giga-
byte of computer files are the traces of absent materials—a letter that 
mentions an enclosed photograph long since misplaced; an editorial 
comment about a missing earlier draft; a reference to a labeled disk 
not found in the accession. A computer is a working environment 
that contains tantalizing traces and reminders that any single ma-
chine is part of a much larger material and virtual network and has 
relationships with a variety of other computers, devices, and servers 
not transferred to the archives.
Turning on a computer to determine whether it is functional 
risks writing data to the hard disk and altering the registry (see sec-
tion 2.5.3). Capturing a forensic image of the hard disk, using either 
a version of the dd utility or imaging software, is a less invasive 
approach that will ensure the safety of the collection materials.13 In 
the case of legacy machines, collecting older connectors, drives, and 
other equipment may enable archivists—individually or in collabora-
tion with technologists—to devise strategies for capturing images of 
older media in the event that the methods and technology developed 
for use with more contemporary machines are inadequate.
2.1.4.	Conclusions
The challenges presented by legacy formats are ongoing and will 
continue to change as technology evolves. Forensic techniques and 
tools will not eliminate the problems presented by older media, but 
they can make certain parts of the preservation process more efficient 
and more secure. Forensic and other tools can help archivists image 
13 For more information about the dd utility, see http://wiki.linuxquestions.org/wiki/
Dd (accessed 11 August 2010). For more information about dcfldd, an updated version 
of dd with “features useful for forensics and security,” see http://dcfldd.sourceforge.
net/ (accessed 11 August 2010).
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born-digital materials and determine their native formats, but how to 
proceed beyond that point is less clear and will likely be determined 
by a variety of factors, not least of which are educational opportuni-
ties, and some of which (e.g., funding, staff, equipment, institutional 
support) are beyond an archivist’s control. 
One option is to invest resources in migrating files to contem-
porary formats, preserving both the original bit copy and the newer 
representations, with the understanding that some of the formatting 
may be lost. Another is to use legacy media and software to make 
files available in their native formats so that researchers can experi-
ence the look and feel of the original materials as the creator may 
have last seen them. Emulation, another option, would enable archi-
vists to run an older system using a current machine so that research-
ers could experience files in their native environments or, in the case 
of a hard disk image, interact with an emulated version of a creator’s 
computer. The Koninklijke Bibliotheek and the Nationaal Archief of 
the Netherlands have pursued emulation as both a preservation and 
access strategy, as has the team at Emory University responsible for 
the Salman Rushdie Papers (van der Hoeven et al. 2007, 2:2; Loftus 
2010a). The CAMiLEON project (1999–2003), undertaken by the Uni-
versities of Michigan and Leeds, also explores the issues that arise 
with using emulation as a preservation strategy.14  
These and other projects raise questions about what archivists 
and curators need to know about legacy formats, and technology 
more broadly, in order to preserve born-digital materials and make 
them available to researchers. Do archivists and curators need infor-
mation technology training to understand the hardware, software, 
and other details of the digital objects in their collections? Or is a 
collaborative model involving a variety of stakeholders with differ-
ent skill sets—for example, archivists, technologists, and forensic ex-
perts—a more realistic approach? Researchers who access born-dig-
ital archival materials in repositories will also need to be equipped 
with certain skill sets and tools to make full use of the materials, but 
it remains to be determined whether the onus for supplying these re-
sources will be on the researcher or the repository and its staff. What 
tools and access mechanisms (e.g., hex editor, emulated platforms, 
legacy OS and applications) is it reasonable for a repository to pro-
vide, and which should a researcher bring? These questions are not 
unique to legacy computing systems. It is not unusual, for example, 
for a patron to bring a portable collator in to a research collection, but 
should that patron also be expected to have a suite of text-analysis 
software installed on her laptop? Beyond access to particular skills 
or tools, researchers will need to be educated in the ethical boundar-
ies of their inquiries. Access to a disk image, even one thought to be 
properly redacted, may inadvertently expose systems data, tempo-
rary files, or the kind of “hidden” information characteristic of files 
created with the Microsoft Office suite (see section 2.5.3). Without 
diminishing the responsibility archivists have to ensure appropriate 
14 See http://www2.si.umich.edu/CAMILEON/index.html.
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redaction, it seems likely that there will be instances when scholars 
must exercise professional and ethical judgment as to the appropri-
ateness of using some of the born-digital evidence to which they 
have access, especially when materials have been processed in batch. 
2.2. Unique and Irreplaceable  
The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO) defines culture as “a set of distinctive spiritual, ma-
terial, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group 
[that] encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways 
of living together, values systems, traditions and beliefs” (UNESCO 
2008). Historically, governments, organizations, communities, fami-
lies, and individuals have identified as important different aspects 
of the varied traditions that comprise the cultural record, and have 
worked to preserve them. To a certain extent, culture arises from the 
patterns according to which people interact. Such relationships are 
not unique to sentient beings; computer files also exist as part of a 
complex system that defines how they relate to one another. Preserv-
ing born-digital materials means preserving not only the object itself 
but also its relationship to other objects, or its position as part of a 
larger process. Those relationships—how a file fits into a particular 
system, whether that system is actually the file system, a personal 
organizational strategy, or a much larger network—are what make 
each file unique and irreplaceable.  
2.2.1.	Materials	at	Risk
During the 2009 election protests in Iran, protestors and others used 
Twitter and YouTube to share information about the military pres-
ence on the streets and photos and videos documenting the violence 
as it unfolded.15 One particularly powerful video was a YouTube clip 
showing Neda Agha-Soltan bleeding to death from a gunshot wound 
in the streets of Tehran (Fathi 2009).16 Although this political example 
may seem far removed from the safe walls of some modern archival 
repositories, the protests in Iran generated born-digital documenta-
tion of a moment that has already proved to be of great historical 
importance, not only in terms of the country’s political situation 
but also because of the unprecedented role social media and digital 
technology played in documenting the protests and instantaneously 
disseminating the information worldwide. The ability of the Internet 
to facilitate the spread of born-digital files, whether in textual, video, 
or audio form, has direct bearing on the question of what types of 
digital cultural heritage materials exist and are in danger of falling 
by the wayside. Failing to preserve ephemeral born-digital cultural 
artifacts—the original digital videos and photos, the tweets, the You-
Tube content—would mean the loss of a large swath of the primary 
15 See http://twitter.com/iranelection09 (accessed 17 March 2010).
16 The YouTube video, formerly available at http://www.youtube.com/verify_
age?&next_url=/watch%3Fv%3DOjQxq5N--Kc, “Basij shots [sic] to death a young 
woman June 20th,” is now available only to subscribers over the age of 18. 
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source materials documenting the 2009 elections in Iran.17 
Part of the challenge is that the historical and cultural value of 
an item, including its relationship to other events or items, is often 
not obvious. Failure to preserve these digital objects could result in 
the loss of materials whose cultural significance is not immediately 
apparent. Many may represent the germ of an important idea—a 
fragment of text, a snippet of video, or an image that inspires the 
development of a current or future project. The Michael Joyce Papers 
at the Harry Ransom Center include a newspaper clipping from the 
Jackson Citizen Patriot, dated 28 January 1978, with a black-and-white 
photo of snowmobilers watching their vehicle burn. It is the direct 
antecedent for a passage that appears nearly 10 years later in the 
“winter” node of Joyce’s seminal hypertext work afternoon, a story 
(1987), born-digital versions of which also reside in the Joyce papers: 
“They stood, as if posed, all begoggled, all in helmets, nylon jump-
suits and foam injected boots, watching helplessly as a snowmobile 
burned in the snow before them” (Joyce 1990). This prose passage in 
a hypertext work that exists only in digital form not only illustrates 
the hybrid nature of the contemporary archives being created today 
but also underscores that relationships exist among different media 
types in the same holding. One of the primary challenges archivists 
and others face is figuring out how to preserve these connections—
across media types as well as within a shared environment—and 
then represent that information to users.
Preserving relationships at the file level may become somewhat 
easier when the digital object is a personal computer: a contained 
fonds,18 or record group, with file system, organizational structure, 
and interrelationships intact. The computers in the Salman Rushdie 
Papers at Emory University are an example not only of the type of 
acquisitions archivists and others can expect to receive more of in the 
near future but also of the potential for technology to transform and 
embody certain aspects of a creator’s life. One outcome of the furor 
surrounding the publication of The Satanic Verses in 1988 and the sub-
sequent fatwa was a substantial shift in Rushdie’s writing practices. 
Speaking to Amrit Dhillon in 1995, Rushdie commented that “one of 
the effects of [the fatwa] is that it taught me to write on a computer 
since I had to have a way of moving my office” (Dhillon 2000, 172). 
As both a writing tool and an artifact, the computer itself, as well as 
the manuscripts, drawings, correspondence, and personalized fea-
tures contained within its environment, reveals important informa-
tion about Rushdie, his work, and its cultural impact. An emulated 
version of one of Rushdie’s computers, a Macintosh Performa 5400, 
17 Nor are scholars necessarily waiting for archivists. In this instance, the HyperCities 
project at the University of California, Los Angeles, has launched a geodistributed, 
crowd-curated “collection” of images, Twitter feeds, and YouTube videos from the 
election and its aftermath. See http://hypercities.com/blog/2009/12/08/new-
featured-collection-election-protests-in-iran/ for more details.
18 The Society of American Archivists’ Glossary of Archival and Records Terminology 
defines fonds as “the entire body of records of an organization, family, or individual 
that have been created and accumulated as the result of an organic process reflecting 
the functions of the creator.” Available at http://www.archivists.org/glossary/term_
details.asp?DefinitionKey=756 (accessed 17 August 2010).
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has been made available to users in the reading room at Emory, in 
addition to a full-text-searchable database containing born-digital 
files and related metadata (Loftus 2010a).19 
In the case of the Rushdie materials, the relationships among 
the files within the Performa’s system are presented to researchers 
in situ rather than as file paths apparent only by looking retrospec-
tively at the structural metadata. In many cases, however, the data 
on the computer or other media are only one part of a much larger 
organism, consisting of files, people, external storage media, and ma-
chines, that perhaps must be reconstituted from the parts rather than 
saved whole. Forensics can provide archivists and other information 
professionals with a methodology and techniques to capture as much 
information as possible from a piece of digital media and to properly 
document the initial stages of the preservation process, but many of 
the questions arising from the three previous examples remain open 
and unresolved.
2.2.2.	Forensics
Forensic techniques, coupled with an acquisition such as the Rushdie 
computers, give archivists the ability to capture a significant por-
tion of a creator’s digital working environment and to begin to suss 
out the relationships of the materials contained within. Using disk 
imaging, it is possible to capture a bit-for-bit copy, or image, of an 
entire machine, including aesthetic details like desktop wallpaper 
and screen saver settings, organizational elements such as directory 
structures, metadata about individual files, and the contents of files. 
Additional recoverable information includes data that a creator may 
have left on the machine unknowingly, such as the Internet-browsing 
history, recycle bin contents, and hidden or temporary files, as well 
as items documenting the machine’s relationship with other personal 
digital devices (e.g., cell phone, iPod, flash drive), networks, and 
cloud-based information. (The ethical issues raised by forensic meth-
ods of capture and analysis are addressed in section 3.) 
Capturing bit-for-bit images of digital media ensures that the 
contents of the original media, including hidden and deleted files, 
will be copied in such a way that all available data are preserved in-
tact. Files on digital media can range from the relatively simple—for 
example, a single-page text document with no special formatting—to 
the more complex, such as a hypertext manuscript of Michael Joyce’s 
afternoon, a Web site or database, or, as with the Rushdie materials, 
an entire personal computer. But even the most “simple” docu-
ments may contain personalized elements or hidden data, both of 
which can have implications for long-term preservation and access. 
Features particular to certain types of software enable creators to 
customize their files. The British playwright Arnold Wesker, for ex-
ample, used Microsoft Word field codes to insert date information 
at the top of many of his letters. Every time one of those Word files 
is opened, the date at the top of the letter automatically changes to 
19 For a broader view of the Emory project, see Cohen 2010. 
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the current date (Dong et al. 2007). Wesker’s field codes illustrate 
but one way a file could inadvertently be changed at the moment of 
initial access and make a strong case for a forensics-based acquisition 
strategy that focuses on capturing original bit copies of born-digital 
archival materials before making any attempt to access the contents. 
In both situations, the image file acts as a container of sorts, captur-
ing and packaging the contents so that they are not modified, until 
some future date when the archivist is ready to work with individual 
file formats or has procedures in place regarding how to handle hid-
den data.
Once a disk has been imaged, checksums can be used to verify 
that the information in the disk image matches that on the original 
medium. Forensic techniques ranging from image capture to com-
plex data analysis will give archivists the ability to capture and pre-
serve as much information as possible, and to do it more efficiently 
than if they were working with individually copied files. Capturing 
a single image file of a disk containing 100 individual files organized 
in a complex hierarchy is much easier and less time-consuming than 
copying each of the 100 files individually and then documenting a 
process that might well vary for each file. In addition, devising a 
naming convention and assigning preservation metadata to a single 
disk image, or even a hundred disk images of the same format, is 
much easier than naming and generating metadata for an assortment 
of individually copied files of different formats.20 Forensic meth-
odologies will help archivists simplify the initial stages of capture, 
preservation metadata, and storage so that they can capture data 
from digital media sooner rather than later, and consequently be able 
to devote more time to the later, more complex activities associated 
with long-term preservation. Nonetheless, it is important to remem-
ber that even a disk image is an abstraction, or more properly an 
interpretation, of physical phenomena on an original piece of media. 
The disk image is still a surrogate for the artifact.
2.3. Trustworthiness
The concept of trust, or trustworthiness, with regard to archival 
materials can be traced to the emergence in the sixth century of a 
set of criteria for distinguishing forged documents from authentic 
originals, which by the seventeenth century had developed into 
a field of study called diplomatics (Duranti 1998, 36; see the side-
bar on pp. 10–11). In Trusting Records, Heather MacNeil breaks 
20 Although this focus on efficiency bears some resemblance to the “more product, 
less process” approach advocated by Mark Greene and Dennis Meissner in their 2005 
American Archivist article, it is important to note that here we are discussing capture 
and storage, not processing. The potential security concerns presented by born-digital 
materials are serious, and we are neither proposing that repositories provide public 
access to forensic images without a creator’s permission nor suggesting that disk 
images that have not been examined for sensitive information and cleared be handed 
over to researchers for use. Although some repositories have processed born-digital 
collection materials, the amount of time processing takes (or even what processing 
entails in the digital realm) is too variable for there to be any reliable data about 
average processing time for these materials.
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trustworthiness down into two components: authenticity and reli-
ability. “Reliability,” she explains, “means that the record is capable 
of standing for the facts to which it attests, while authenticity means 
that the record is what it claims to be” (MacNeil 2000, xi).21 But an 
authentic source may be deceptive or unreliable, and although reli-
ability is an important component of trustworthiness, the veracity of 
a document’s content is often not the concern of archivists working 
with cultural heritage materials. Rather, the provenance of both ana-
log and digital materials, as well as documentation about their stor-
age environment, what has been done to them, and by whom, are the 
key aspects of establishing and maintaining trust. Trustworthiness—
of an institution, a custodian, or a document—plays an important 
role in the acquisition and maintenance of born-digital materials. 
How best to determine and document that quality in a digital envi-
ronment and with regard to the stewardship of born-digital materi-
als is a question that remains under consideration.22 This section 
addresses the broad issues related to trust, or trustworthiness, with 
regard to born-digital materials, and in particular the role forensics 
can play in defining and establishing this trust. (A more detailed con-
sideration of authenticity is undertaken in section 2.4.)
2.3.1.	Tracking	Trust
Trustworthiness is a concept and an obligation that spans the life of 
a document, whether it is a sheaf of paper or a WordPerfect file. The 
needs of born-digital objects shift as files move through the stages of 
the preservation process, from initial capture and metadata extrac-
tion to longer-term strategies such as migration and rights manage-
ment. Born-digital fonds are similarly mobile as they pass from the 
creator, to an intermediary such as a dealer or other agent (human or 
technological), to staff at an archival repository, and, finally, to stor-
age and, perhaps, ingest into a digital repository. The stages of that 
journey constitute the chain of custody for a digital object, and each 
stage has important implications for the trustworthiness of the born-
digital materials in a given accession.
Clifford Lynch remarks in “Authenticity and Integrity in the 
Digital Environment” that “it is important to recognize that trust is 
not necessarily an absolute, but often a subjective probability that 
we assign case by case” (Lynch 2000, 46). This subjectivity seems 
particularly important with regard to cultural heritage materials, 
many of which are personal files created by individuals rather than 
records generated by the employees of an institution, and most of 
which pass through several hands before arriving at a repository. 
21 The definitions in the Society of American Archivists’ glossary are slightly different. 
See http://www.archivists.org/glossary/.
22 The InterPARES projects have done important work in this area. In particular, 
Domain 2 of the second project considered whether and in what ways concepts of 
reliability and authenticity are applicable across artistic, scientific, and government 
activities. See the InterPARES Web site for information about all three projects: http://
www.interpares.org/ and the Domain 2 Task Force Report in the InterPARES II book 
at http://www.interpares.org/ip2/book.cfm (accessed April 2010). Also see MacNeil 
2000 and Lynch 2000. 
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This trajectory is not all that different from that of paper materials; 
however, with born digital, there is a greater potential for chang-
ing digital objects—in other words, for disrupting the metadata that 
form one component of trustworthiness—by the very act of access. 
On the other hand, it may be possible to use forensic techniques to 
determine what has been altered and when, thus not only allow-
ing archivists, repositories, or dealers to reestablish provenance but 
perhaps also enabling archivists to document the absence, as well as 
presence, of certain materials. What does trust look like in the digital 
landscape, and what is the role of the creator, or even the dealer, in 
establishing and transferring that trust? 
2.3.2.	Intermediaries
Unless a creator delivers born-digital items directly to a repository, 
there are intermediaries involved in the transfer process. These can 
include family members, rare-book and manuscript dealers, moving 
companies, networks and servers (if the files are transferred virtu-
ally), external hard drives or flash drives (in the case of snapshot 
accessions or similar capture arrangements), and others. 23 In the 
digital realm, the question of what trustworthy stewardship means 
is complicated by the potential for the mere act of opening a file or 
booting up a computer to alter the archival materials in fundamental 
ways. For example, if a dealer or a family member accesses a floppy 
disk after a creator’s death to determine the contents, the date- and 
time-stamps for the opened files may reflect when that person ac-
cessed a file, rather than when the creator last read or manipulated it. 
When the born-digital object in question is a computer, simply turn-
ing on the machine can result in data being written to the hard drive. 
In other words, born-digital materials can be compromised not only 
physically (e.g., broken or exposed to adverse conditions), but also at 
the logical level (e.g., altered files and metadata). The time between 
when born-digital materials leave a creator’s possession and when 
they arrive at the repository is marked by particular vulnerablity.24 
In order for the materials to travel safely from creator to archival 
repository and to be documented properly, dealers and others will 
need to assume some level of responsibility for the trustworthiness 
of the digital files.25 As digital items make up an ever-larger portion 
23 In “The Archival Management of Personal Records in Electronic Form: Some 
Suggestions” (Archives and Manuscripts 22 [May 1994]: 94-105), Adrian Cunningham 
uses the term “pre-custodial intervention” to argue for the responsible creation, 
management, and documentation of personal records before they arrive at a 
repository.
24 Cathy Marshall notes that “changing institutional or professional affiliation is a 
consistent source of vulnerability for personal archives, trumping many expected 
problems with formats and media.” In many ways, the situation Marshall describes 
is analogous to a transfer of digital materials from a creator to a repository. “Change 
makes digital belongings more vulnerable,” she concludes (Marshall 2008c). 
25 At the 2009 First Digital Lives Research Conference at the British Library, the 
three dealers who served on the panel entitled “On the Monetary Value of Personal 
Digital Objects” acknowledged that at that time (February 2009) they had no formal 
procedures in place for valuing or handling the born-digital materials in collections. 
See the conference Web site at http://www.bl.uk/digital-lives/conference.html 
(accessed 13 April 2010).
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of archival collections, dealers in particular will need to find nonin-
vasive ways to assess the contents of digital media for representation 
in collection inventories and the like. In addition, once a dealer or 
creator has found a home for a born-digital collection, it would be 
ideal for the materials to reach their final destination with a docu-
mented chain of custody (perhaps even including access history) and 
authentication information that can be verified upon arrival.26 
2.3.3.	Repositories
Duranti notes that in the ancient world “authenticity [was] not an in-
trinsic character of documents but [was] accorded to them by the fact 
of their preservation in a designated place, a temple, public office, 
treasury, or archives” (Duranti 1998, 36). The location of the origi-
nals, the repository, conferred authenticity. Although other methods 
now exist by which to authenticate documents, physical location still 
confers a certain amount of weight. However, an institution that has 
a proven track record with regard to conserving, processing, and 
making available paper manuscripts—in other words, is trusted to 
handle traditional archival materials—is not necessarily a trustwor-
thy custodian of digital objects.27 Archival repositories must earn 
the trust of current and future digital creators. Developing a robust 
infrastructure and long-term preservation plan are necessary steps 
toward demonstrating that an archival repository and its staff are 
trustworthy stewards of the born-digital materials in their care. 
Digital repositories within an archives or another organization 
should also conform to agreed-upon models or standards. In 2002, 
the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (a standards 
body composed of representatives from the world’s major space 
agencies) published the Reference Model for an Open Archival Informa-
tion System (OAIS), which suggests standards for the submission, 
identification, search and retrieval, migration, and more, of digital 
materials. The OAIS model “provides a framework for the under-
standing and increased awareness of archival concepts needed for 
long-term digital information preservation and access, and for de-
scribing and comparing architectures and operations of existing and 
future archives.”28 It became an approved International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) standard in 2003 and has been adopted 
by a variety of groups and institutions.29 In 2007, the Center for Re-
search Libraries (CRL), in collaboration with the Research Libraries 
26 The potential for forgeries in the digital age has direct bearing on many of the issues 
related to trust and different types of value addressed in this and other sections. The 
concept of the “original” (or even the “original copy”) is very different and differently 
determined when the materials in question are born digital. It remains to be seen how 
the trade in (and detection of) forgeries will evolve to fit the digital landscape, and the 
ramifications for collecting archives, scholars, and other stakeholders.
27 In 1996, the Task Force on Archiving of Digital Information, a joint effort of the 
Commission on Preservation and Access and the Research Libraries Group (RLG), 
concluded that “a process of certification for digital archives is needed to create an 
overall climate of trust about the prospects of preserving digital information” (Garrett 
and Waters 1996, 40).
28 See http://public.ccsds.org/publications/RefModel.aspx (accessed 22 August 2010).
29 See the “OAIS in Practice: Some Examples” section of the Paradigm Workbook. 
Available at http://www.paradigm.ac.uk/workbook/introduction/oais-examples.
html (accessed 14 April 2010).
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In the fall of 2008, Stanford University Libraries undertook a survey to identify the digital archival materials (handheld media) in its collections. We 
defined “handheld media” as materials stored offline 
on digital carriers of various forms and ages. The goal 
of the survey was to quantify the volume, distribution, 
and age of these materials and to identify collections at 
risk of loss owing to bit rot and format obsolescence. 
The survey identified more than 18,000 unique items 
of handheld media widely distributed across all biblio-
graphic collecting areas. 
The scope and scale of the challenge presented by born-
digital materials on handheld media are growing. A re-
view of statistics gathered from the accession logs of 
special and archival collections reveals that the percent-
age of Stanford collections with digital 
materials has increased nearly fivefold 
in the past five years. These materials 
are at great risk of loss, and without 
near-term action are likely to disap-
pear from the corpus of primary source 
materials.
In 2009, survey results in hand, our li-
brary staff met with Jeremy Leighton 
John of the British Library and Susan 
Thomas at the Bodleian Libraries. Both 
graciously shared their forensic knowl-
edge and offered recommendations about hardware 
and software. In the summer of 2009, Stanford Univer-
sity Libraries began building its own digital forensics 
lab (http://lib.stanford.edu/digital-forensics). Two 
Forensic Recovery of Evidence Devices (FREDs) were 
purchased, along with a copy stand and a digital SLR 
camera to photograph the handheld media. Licenses to 
commercial forensic software (Access Data’s Forensic 
Toolkit and Guidance Software’s EnCase Forensic) were 
purchased, and special collections staff were trained in 
the use of this hardware and software. The hardware 
was locally modified by installing a wide range of lega-
cy drives. With these modifications, the digital forensics 
lab is capable of forensically imaging floppy disks of 
many densities and sizes, magnetic hard drives, optical 
discs, flash memory devices, and Iomega Zip Disks.
In fall 2009, Stanford University Libraries became a 
member of the AIMS Project. As part of this project, staff 
members are planning and testing a working model for 
dealing with handheld media at Stan-
ford University Libraries & Academic 
Information Resources (SULAIR). The 
AIMS funding allowed Stanford to hire 
a digital archivist to staff the digital 
forensics lab and to begin processing 
born-digital manuscript collections.
To date, the computer media in the Ste-
phen Jay Gould Papers and the Robert 
Creeley Papers have been forensically 
preserved and described using Ac-
cess Data’s Forensic Toolkit. These two 
collections contain more than 200 pieces of handheld 
media. We have been unable to forensically image ap-
proximately 5 percent of the handheld media in these 
collections because of physical damage, format incom-
patibilities, and bit rot. 
Data about the forensic 
imaging process are be-
ing tracked in a database 
with the goal of using 
such data to better tar-
get future preservation 
efforts. Another goal is 
to preserve all handheld 
media in newly acquired 
collections. We are devel-
oping a workflow that we 
hope will make this goal 
feasible.
—Michael Olson, Stanford 
University Libraries
Digital Forensics at Stanford University Libraries
31Digital Forensics and Born-Digital Content in Cultural Heritage Collections
Group (RLG) and the National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA), published Trustworthy Repositories Audit & Certification 
(TRAC), a set of criteria by which to judge the trustworthiness of a 
digital repository.30 Two recent projects in the United Kingdom, the 
Data Audit Framework (DAF) led by the Humanities Advanced 
Technology and Information Institute (HATII) at the University of 
Glasgow in collaboration with the Digital Curation Centre, and the 
DRAMBORA (Digital Repository Audit Method Based on Risk As-
sessment) project developed by the Digital Curation Centre and 
DigitalPreservationEurope, present audit methodologies, as well as 
other information, to help organizations better manage and curate 
their digital objects.31
Implementing models based on shared standards is one step to-
ward becoming a trustworthy repository for born-digital materials. 
Adopting forensic practices geared toward establishing a chain of 
custody and implementing a series of checks and balances to ensure 
that when digital objects arrive at an archival repository they are 
transferred intact and with appropriate documentation are two other 
important steps. This level of information management is closely 
linked to the role of transparency in establishing an archival reposi-
tory, as well as the repository it uses to manage digital objects, as a 
trustworthy custodian of the born-digital materials in its collection. 
Forensic techniques can aid archivists in the processes of capture and 
preliminary analysis that precede ingest into storage (e.g., external 
hard drive, server) or a digital repository, as well as with further 
analysis, file recovery, and archival processing.
2.3.4.	Forensics
At the most basic level, forensic practices are geared toward estab-
lishing the authenticity of files, conducting analysis to discern their 
characteristics, and generating documentation about what has been 
done and when. Forensic methods of capture (e.g., creating disk im-
ages), authentication (comparing checksums and other metadata to 
verify both physical and intellectual integrity), and documentation 
can ensure that information is acquired from a born-digital object 
in a way that can be proved not to alter the original bit streams. 
If creators or dealers are willing to create disk images of materi-
als themselves or allow archivists to do so, the image format will 
provide a protective container of sorts (in that the operating system 
will interact with the image file rather than its contents) that will be 
easier to transfer from creator to intermediaries to archival reposi-
tory. Checksums generated in conjunction with the capture process 
can be compared by creators, intermediaries, and repositories at dif-
ferent stages of the transfer process to verify that the disk images and 
other files are exact copies of the original bit streams. In addition, 
30 See http://www.crl.edu/archiving-preservation/digital-archives/metrics-
assessing-and-certifying (accessed January 2010).
31 See DAF project Web site at http://www.data-audit.eu/; and Jones, Ross, and 
Ruusalepp 2008. See DRAMBORA project Web site at http://www.repositoryaudit.
eu/; and McHugh et al. 2008.
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documentation such as a list of files and their relationships within 
the original disk image could be verified by a repository to ensure 
that all the files have not only arrived with their integrity intact (i.e., 
hashes) but also retain their native contextual information.
Forensic tools can also be used to recover deleted or hidden files, 
as well as to conduct text and image searches in order to discover 
particular content or types of files. These analytic capabilities raise 
serious ethical questions. For example, how should archives handle 
the discovery of data—deleted files, browsing history, residual tem-
porary files—that a creator might not have intended to include with 
the accession? (For an in-depth consideration of ethics, see section 3.) 
On the other hand, archivists can use the same forensic techniques 
to locate and redact information that creators have specified as “re-
stricted” in their contracts with the repository. As more repositories 
move toward nontraditional acquisition strategies, such as snapshot 
accessions or even self-archiving, forensic tools may give archivists 
the ability to explain to a creator the different types of data in her 
born-digital archives and come to an agreement, prior to formal 
acquisition, about what she does and does not want to transfer to 
the repository. Ideally, these tools and techniques will not only help 
archivists establish the trustworthiness of the materials but will also 
help repositories build informed relationships with the creators 
whose digital materials are in their care.
2.4. Authenticity 
One of the key challenges facing archivists and scholars who work 
with digital materials at any level of complexity relates to the au-
thenticity of the digital object. Questions about authenticity have 
been at the heart of the scholarly process since Renaissance scholars 
invented the discipline of historical enquiry in its modern sense. 
The expectations of scholars with regard to the reliability of sources 
have evolved over the centuries, from the assumption that librarians 
and archivists would present researchers with evidence that could 
be relied upon to be verifiable, to more modern understandings that 
dispense with the ideal of the reliable source and consider all texts 
as potentially deceptive and richly ambiguous. Ideally, the methods 
of operation and processes developed by repositories over years 
of working with scholars and other patrons enable staff to provide 
researchers with documentation about the provenance and acquisi-
tion of the items in their care. This type of contextual information 
supports the scholarly process by providing evidence, as it were, 
about the documents in question. The process of assigning library 
or archive reference numbers to materials allows other scholars to 
investigate these same documents and scrutinize them anew. The 
conclusions that scholars draw from undertaking such studies have 
therefore developed a legitimacy that is intimately bound up not 
only with the legitimacy of the source materials that formed the basis 
of the initial scholarly investigation but also with the reliability of the 
internal systems by which the repository documents how and when 
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the items were acquired, their provenance, and the circumstances of 
their storage and organization once on-site.
To support this nexus, scholars, librarians, and archivists have 
developed a set of tools that have themselves spawned a number 
of subdisciplines: palaeography (the study of handwriting), codi-
cology (the study of the codex or book), papyrology (the study of 
papyrus as a material for documentation), diplomatics (the study 
of documents; see the sidebar on diplomatics), and descriptive 
and analytical bibliography. The growth and development of these 
subdisciplines have encouraged scholars to specialize in them as 
offshoots of major subject areas such as literature and history. Librar-
ians, archivists, and other staff, all of whom have the opportunity to 
interact with a broader range of documents than most scholars do, 
have developed related skill sets based on the utility of these subdis-
ciplines for their own work. In recent years, librarians and archivists 
have worked increasingly closely with conservation professionals, 
who have brought yet another set of skills and experience to bear on 
these issues. Conservators have a more nuanced view of the mate-
riality of books and manuscripts and have increasingly forged links 
with scientists who have been able to bring techniques such as PIXE 
analysis and Raman spectroscopy to bear in the analysis of pigments 
and ink, for example.
With the emergence of primary sources in digital form, the de-
mand on the librarian and archivist to continue to support scholars 
by presenting them with trusted primary sources has reached a level 
of complexity undreamed of by the palaeographers of previous 
generations. The technological, ethical, conceptual, and procedural 
issues driving this complexity are relatively new to the humani-
ties and information studies, and so far lack the weight of scholarly 
legitimacy that surrounds more traditional subdisciplines such as 
codicology.32 Even in the relatively short span of their existence, the 
document types and file formats present in the era of the digital ar-
chive have changed with unsettling rapidity. 
Scholars, librarians, and archivists tasked with preserving, 
describing, or analyzing born-digital materials face an additional 
challenge: whether and how to leverage the fundamental tools and 
concepts derived from scholarly traditions developed over the past 
150 years, and how to incorporate those tools into methodologies de-
signed to tackle new media formats. Since the mid-nineteenth centu-
ry, such tools as catalogs of dated and datable manuscripts, guidance 
manuals defining and classifying scripts (handwriting), repertories 
of watermarks, and catalogs of book bindings, among others, have 
32 Nonetheless, “digital humanities,” as it is increasingly widely known, has been 
practiced in some form or other for decades, going back to the text-processing 
experiments of Father Roberto Busa, SJ, who used early IBM mainframes to assist 
in the compilation of his majestic concordance to Thomas Aquinas. Many younger 
scholars increasingly self-identify as “digital humanists,” and the Alliance of Digital 
Humanities Organizations runs a well-attended international conference every year 
(see http://digitalhumanities.org/). The digital humanities community offers much 
promise for future collaborations between scholars and archivists around born-digital 
materials.
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served as reference weapons in the armory of the scholar, librarian, 
and archivist. The scholarly community has passed these tools, ap-
proaches, and traditions to the book trade, where reputable dealers 
have been able to use citations to the literature of reference works of 
the types described above to confirm the authenticity of the books 
and manuscripts that make up part of their commercial stock. In the 
digital domain, with a bibliography that is both younger and of ne-
cessity much smaller, the scholar, librarian, and archivist have poten-
tially more to fear from the trade than from any time since the days 
of the notorious but highly skillful forger Thomas James Wise.
The scholar in the digital era needs to able to ascertain whether 
the digital records she is using are authentic, reliable, and usable—in 
short, whether they are trustworthy. The archivist is most concerned 
with verifying the authenticity of the born-digital materials in her 
care; generating documentation that other staff and scholars can eas-
ily use to trace an object’s chain of custody, determine its integrity, 
and accurately represent its context within the larger body of materi-
als; and, finally, making the materials available to researchers. Ad-
vances in digital watermarking, digital signatures, and other forms 
of electronic-document security are likely to proceed apace. But 
while technological tools can be deployed to authenticate a digital 
object, extract metadata, and make the object available to scholars, 
some of the most important techniques needed to establish the trust-
worthiness of digital objects are organizational, revolving around 
human behaviors such as encouraging professional ethics, recruiting 
staff with the appropriate skills and attitudes, and monitoring their 
work. (See section 3 for a more detailed consideration of these orga-
nizational challenges.) Final judgments must continue to reside with 
the instinct and expertise of the individual scholar.
2.4.1.	Origination	and	Identification
The scholar, librarian, and archivist have often relied upon under-
standing the provenance of an item as a fundamental tool in as-
sessing the trustworthiness of a book or manuscript as a carrier of 
information. In 1985, Roger Stoddard, then curator of rare books at 
Harvard University’s Houghton Library, wrote a seminal essay in 
which he stated that “as anthropologists have discovered, traces of 
wear can tell us how artifacts were used by human beings. Books,” 
he continued, “no less than tools, apparel and habitats can show 
signs of wear, but their markings can be far more eloquent of manu-
facturing processes, specific of provenance, telling of human rela-
tions and suggestive of human thought” (Stoddard 1985, 1). This 
understanding of provenance has been adopted in the trade in books 
and manuscripts as a critical factor in assessing price. 
In the digital world, provenance is much harder to establish. 
Very often, the most that can be done is to document the circum-
stances in which the digital files were acquired; for this reason, it 
is often crucial that visits and interviews by an archivist from an 
acquiring institution be made in order to judge the context and en-
vironment from which data are being acquired. The same questions 
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addressed by the archivist undertaking an acquisition exercise can be 
used subsequently by scholars examining digital records stored in an 
archive in order to establish information about their veracity:
• Have the files been acquired directly from the data creator? If so, 
the supporting documentation should be completed so that schol-
ars working with the files can see that there have been no oppor-
tunities to interfere with the files in an unauthorized or unidenti-
fied manner.
• What was the computing environment in which the digital re-
cords were created and stored? Was it managed in a way that 
minimized the risk of unauthorized intervention? Have the files 
been created in an offline computing environment? If so, what are 
the implications of this? 
When it is not possible to answer these questions, physical exam-
ination of the hardware and media that carry the files may indicate 
whether they have been in compromising circumstances.
2.4.2.	Data	Integrity	and	Fixity
The advent of born-digital materials in archival repositories adds 
another layer of complexity to what has long been a primary concern 
for scholars, archivists, and others working with manuscript materi-
als: the physical and intellectual integrity of the items in a collection. 
Although generating fixity information such as hash functions (e.g., 
MD5, SHA-1) is relatively easy, managing that information over 
time is harder as documentation of the authenticity and integrity of 
digital objects poses administrative challenges with direct bearing 
on the needs of scholars and other patrons. The scholar analyzing 
a primary source must know whether it has been modified since 
its creation and completion as a carrier of information. In the case 
of many documents, the addition of subsequent layers of informa-
tion is unproblematic, as revision by the creator and others indicates 
subsequent use, consideration, or elaboration. Take, for example, the 
Harry Ransom Center’s copy of The Georgiad, South African writer 
Roy Campbell’s poetic attack on Vita Sackville-West and her circle, 
which he wrote after she seduced his wife, Mary. The Center’s print-
ed copy of the poem contains Campbell’s handwritten elaboration of 
his accusations—a secondary layer of text that provides additional 
meaning. Such additions can often be identified through provenance 
analysis, therefore attributed to known individuals, and assessed ap-
propriately by scholars. 
In the case of digital archives, however, it is easier both to iden-
tify and conceal surreptitious interventions to the original text. On 
the one hand, this facility potentially creates severe (some would 
say interesting) problems for future researchers; on the other hand, 
because digital files often conceal as much information as they pres-
ent, forensic analysis might make it possible to recover additional 
information that would allow researchers to attribute certain changes 
to one person rather than another. The Ransom Center’s Thomas 
Zigal Papers include Microsoft Word page proofs of Zigal’s novel 
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The Bodleian Libraries collect archives from a wide range of individuals and organizations. Like oth-er research libraries, we find that accessions of 
modern manuscripts contain an increasing quantity of 
digital material; our policy has been to encourage this 
in the hope of obtaining the best-possible record for the 
scholarly community. 
The Clutag Press archive is a good example of a mod-
ern archive collection. From the beginning, its contents 
have been hybrid, consisting of paper and digital ma-
terials in equal measure. Tranches of the archive have 
been collected regularly since 2007; these include disks 
and digital transfers as well as the papers that are more 
familiar to archivists. Working with hybrid collections 
such as Clutag has been a means of gaining valuable 
experience in digital curation, and we are building on 
this experience as we develop the Bodleian Electronic 
Archives and Manuscripts (BEAM) service to curate 
digital archives. 
Digital forensics tools are one part of BEAM’s armory. 
We use these tools as archivists rather than as forensic 
examiners, and our purpose in using them is to sup-
port activities in the archival workflow. Digital forensics 
tools are of interest to us because they are designed to 
maintain the authenticity of source data and are capable 
of dealing with large volumes of heterogeneous data, 
such as we find in personal or corporate digital archives. 
To illustrate our use of digital forensics tools, the fol-
lowing paragraphs consider some steps of the workflow 
typically applied to a hybrid archive.
Separation
Since remodeling the Western Manuscripts Depart-
ment’s accessioning workflow, we now separate digi-
tal storage media from related papers and feed them 
through to BEAM. This ensures that their contents can 
be captured and ingested to the BEAM preservation 
store at the earliest possible opportunity. BEAM pro-
vides integrity monitoring of the original submissions, 
and improvements in tools to combat technical obsoles-
cence are planned. Digital and traditional materials re-
main linked via a collections-management database and 
will be further reunited through the archive’s finding 
aid once cataloging of the hybrid archive is complete.
 
Capture
The capture process for data residing on the creator’s 
own original disks involves assigning each disk an in-
ventory number, which ensures that we can track it 
and related metadata over time. At this stage we also 
photograph disks to create a visual record of annota-
tions for future catalogers and researchers. 
Digital Forensics at the Bodleian Libraries
3.5-inch disk submitted to the 
Clutag Press by Seamus Heaney.
Next, we use forensic hardware and software tools to 
create a disk image of each item. The process varies 
slightly according to the type of medium, but in each 
case we use a write-blocking device to ensure that no 
data are written back to the source disk. The image be-
low shows a hard disk being imaged.
A hard disk is imaged using one 
of BEAM’s “capture” workstations.
Finally, we verify the disk image to ensure we have 
an accurate representation of the data inscribed on the 
original media.
continued on next page
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The White League (2005) with tracked changes showing not only the 
editor’s comments and edits (with date- and time-stamps) but also 
Zigal’s responses to her changes. Born-digital documents are as un-
stable and as fecund as any historic text, and part of the researcher’s 
challenge will be to reconcile the affordances with the ambiguities 
and to figure out how to continue to uphold scholarly traditions, 
such as the inclusion of verifiable references, while making room for 
new practices. Martin Joseph Routh (1755–1854), when president of 
Magdalen College Oxford, encouraged his students to “always verify 
your references.” This scholarly process remains a cornerstone of ac-
ademic and professional life, but takes on new meaning in an age of 
online databases and other digital resources (Burgon, 1888–9, 1:73).
If the references cannot be trusted, the conclusions drawn from 
an analysis of them are rendered similarly questionable. In recogni-
tion of this fundamental element of scholarship, core aspects of digi-
tal library architecture, such as the OAIS Reference Model (CCSDS 
2002), have been designed to incorporate “fixity information,” or 
information documenting authentication mechanisms such as hashes 
In sum, this capture process gives us:
• a reliable copy of each disk’s contents wrapped in a 
single digital object—the disk image—and a unique 
hash value for that object
• an inventory of the disk’s contents, including hashes 
and format metadata for each object
• metadata about the imaging process 
• photographs of the disks.
This material is packaged in a specific directory struc-
ture and ingested to our preservation store with some 
basic collection and accession metadata. 
Materials Captured On-site
Some archives include digital material that has been 
captured on-site by the digital archivist. This often re-
quires more-selective disk imaging, with the depositor 
outlining which materials she wishes to add to the ar-
chive. In these cases, targeted data are acquired using 
a USB write-blocking device and a disk-imaging utility, 
with an external hard disk serving as a storage medium 
for the data in transit. After the data have been returned 
to BEAM, they are processed in a similar way as are 
items received on removable media.
Digital Forensics for Analysis
BEAM also uses digital forensics analysis tools. These 
tools are used to gain an initial overview of formats in 
the archive, to identify problem items, and to prepare 
the archive for use by a cataloger. All the disk images 
associated with a given collection can be added to a 
“case,” permitting the material to be interrogated in 
many useful ways. The user can browse the creator’s 
structure, browse by format, sort by various file system 
attributes, filter data according to numerous criteria, la-
bel or bookmark data, and perform full-text searches. 
The tool can render many items without the need for 
separate application software, which can be useful for 
previewing data in legacy formats.
To prepare the digital material for a cataloger, the digital 
archivist marks up material that the cataloger can safely 
ignore (such as clip art or software) and notes duplicate 
items, etc. The digital archivist can then export copies 
of files suitable for arrangement and description, and 
migrate them to more modern formats when necessary. 
The analysis tool is also used to generate a table of meta-
data that the cataloger will augment with descriptive 
and other information. Important work done by the cat-
aloger includes allocating items to archival series within 
the finding aid, marking items for disposal, assigning 
identifiers for citation, and providing metadata concern-
ing restrictions. If the cataloging process identifies mate-
rial for disposal, then the data in the BEAM preservation 
store must later be updated to reflect this change.
Digital Forensics for Researchers?
BEAM’s use of forensics tools ends here for the time be-
ing. The library has yet to encounter a depositor who is 
willing to permit researchers access to a reinstantiated 
version of his or her entire computing environment or to 
its indexed full contents. This remains a possibility for 
the future with the right donor.
—Susan Thomas, Bodleian Libraries
Bodleian continued from prior page
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and digital signatures, in order to facilitate verification of the integri-
ty of digital materials. This approach forms part of the core elements 
of the OAIS model, which has guided the architectural develop-
ment of many digital repositories, and in particular the Submission 
Information Package (SIP) and Archival Information Package (AIP). 
However, other techniques, such as digital stratigraphy and the 
analysis of mutual referencing, can also assist in the verification of 
digital information. The frequency of citation and quotation of a digi-
tal document will help establish that information as a trusted source 
in the scholarly world and render subsequent unauthorized changes 
harder to enact without identification.
Managing fixity information and monitoring data integrity is an 
ongoing process that accompanies a digital object as it moves from 
creator, to an archival repository (acquisition, accession), and then to 
a digital repository (ingest) or other storage. One way of approach-
ing issues relating to data integrity is to examine documents twice: 
prior to and after accessioning into a formal archive.
2.4.3.	Preaccession
The transfer process for digital materials needs to be managed care-
fully, and with rigorous adherence to documented procedures incor-
porating standard elements of archival accessioning that have been 
adapted to the needs of digital objects. Transferring archives from 
creator to repository in a managed way will minimize the risk of 
interference with the material, and will allow the archivist to ensure 
that what is accessioned into an archival collection can be monitored 
and kept intact. This process, as described in the Paradigm Workbook 
(2008), involves documentation through the completion of a transfer 
list—which collects details about ownership, context, permissions, 
and technical characteristics—and technical processing, including, 
most importantly, generation of checksums for comparison in future 
integrity checks. Such documentation is no guarantee that the digi-
tal records have not been interfered with prior to their arrival at the 
repository, but it provides a terminus ad quem that will enable the 
archivist responsible for the materials to offer documentation about 
their status at the point of accession. Scholars, in turn, can use this 
documentation to determine whether to consider as trustworthy the 
resources in question. The role of metadata that record fixity infor-
mation can extend to data creators, who could, for example, set en-
cryption keys to provide security controls. An encryption key would 
provide a means of ensuring the integrity of a digital record as it 
passes from the creator to the recipient archive; however, this added 
layer would be complex and expensive to administer, and thus may 
be feasible only for organizations rather than individuals.
2.4.4.	Postaccession
Ensuring the integrity of data after accession requires adherence 
to good archival practice, the rigorous application of technical pro-
cedures to ensure that the digital records are not interfered with 
or altered once in the custody of the repository, and the active 
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intervention of digital archivists at various stages in the archival life 
cycle. These archival processes include rigorous maintenance of the 
metadata required to manage both the use and administration of the 
digital records. Two of the most widely used metadata schemas for 
digital libraries, PREMIS and METS, include provision for record-
ing fixity information: hash functions, checksums, cryptographic 
hash functions, cyclical redundancy checks, and digital signatures. 
(Such information is also a mandatory component of the Data Audit 
Framework suggested by Jones, Ross, and Ruusalepp [2009].) The 
elements suggested by these schemas can be used as the basis for a 
simple database to help an archivist manage the metadata for digital 
objects in a repository’s collection, or they can be incorporated into 
the intellectual framework underlying a digital repository bought or 
built to manage and deliver digital objects. The Paradigm Workbook 
provides useful guidance on the use of metadata (see especially sec-
tion 5 of the workbook). 
Some archival institutions maintain “dark” archives. As a rule, 
such archives are not regularly and routinely accessed, and may be 
maintained under strict security by staff. Dark archives may be cre-
ated because depositors wish for the contents to be kept hidden from 
view until after a certain period of time has expired (such as a period 
of time following the death of the depositor or of other individuals). 
Sometimes dark archives are kept offline in order to create an ad-
ditional security mechanism. In these situations, physical security 
becomes a prime means of ensuring that the materials are not inter-
fered with in an unauthorized manner, sometimes to the extent of 
keeping hardware such as servers locked in a strong room or vault.
2.5. Data Recovery
Recovering lost, eradicated, or obfuscated data from a computer sys-
tem is without a doubt the most dramatic act a forensic investigator 
can perform—the stuff of suspense thrillers and film or television 
drama. It is also the most invasive and ethically fraught act, since 
the procedure may run counter to a donor’s wishes and intentions. 
And it is potentially the most misleading aspect of digital forensics, 
since recovering deleted or hidden data can promote the illusion that 
the evidentiary record is now complete. In fact, a seasoned forensic 
investigator knows the same thing that any good scholar or archivist 
knows: there is always more to discover, and what survives of the 
past is only at best a partial representation of reality.
Unlike a forensic investigation undertaken in a legal setting, 
where individual wishes and intentions are subsumed by jurispru-
dence, in a manuscript collection or other cultural heritage institu-
tion any forensic process is voluntary at some level. If an archivist 
and a forensic investigator find themselves equipped with the same 
tools and capabilities, the former is in a much more precarious ethi-
cal position. Sometimes, of course, a donor may sanction a reposi-
tory’s efforts to recover deleted material, either because it was de-
leted inadvertently or because the donor did not appreciate its value 
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at the time. But what if the donor’s wishes are not known? Does an 
archivist have a de facto responsibility to attempt to perform data 
recovery in order to provide the most complete assessment possible 
of the content on a given piece of media? What if a scholar requests 
that a hard drive be examined for deleted versions of a manuscript 
he is studying? To address such questions, we must first provide an 
overview of how data recovery is done, both general principles and 
specific practices, while working to separate fact from folklore. 
2.5.1.	Remanence
A defining characteristic of digital storage is the seeming paradox of 
its volatility coupled with near-miraculous stories of successful data 
recovery under the most extraordinary circumstances. The Internet 
abounds with tales of data rescued from computers submerged un-
derwater, scorched in house fires, or run over by trucks. Some of the 
most colorful of these tales come from the Web site of a company 
called DriveSavers, which includes celebrity testimonials from the 
likes of Keith Richards, Sean Connery, Sarah Jessica Parker, Sting, 
and many more. DriveSavers was responsible for the recovery of the 
scripts for a dozen then-unproduced episodes of the hit TV show The 
Simpsons, including the season finale “Who Shot Mr. Burns,” which 
has since become a fan favorite.33 In a more sober vein, Ross and 
Gow (1999) chronicle the successful efforts to recover data from the 
Challenger’s flight recorders, while Kirschenbaum (2008) narrates the 
restoration of data from storage media salvaged from the ruins of the 
World Trade Center.
The remarkable staying power of data stored in digital form 
is a function of the physical property of magnetic media known as 
hysteresis, or its capacity to retain a charge over time. Magnetic stor-
age media have been the mainstay of the computer industry from 
early experiments with magnetic drums and ringlets in the 1940s, 
to magnetic tape, to the introduction of floppy disks and the cur-
rent ubiquity of hard drives. Most storage media that an archivist is 
likely to encounter will be magnetic, though optical devices such as 
CD-ROMs and solid-state (flash) memory will also be present as part 
of collections. These, too, are often surprisingly resilient in the face 
of fire, flood, and other disasters that would have spelled doom for 
their paper precursors.
Despite their supposedly pure symbolic nature (bits are often 
described as “switches” or “ones and zeros”) all digital data are 
stored as physical traces or inscriptions. This means that given suf-
ficient time and resources, data can often be recovered even if the 
supporting medium has been traumatized. Governments and other 
institutions with secrets to keep have recognized this phenomenon, 
and procedures for securely erasing (“wiping”) magnetic media 
have long been pursued. In A Guide to Understanding Data Remanence 
in Automated Information Systems, first published by the National 
Computer Security Center in 1991, data remanence is defined as “the 
33 See http://www.drivesaversdatarecovery.com/company-info/hall-of-fame/. 
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residual physical representation of data that has been in some way 
erased.” The report states, “After storage media is erased there may 
be some physical characteristics that allow data to be reconstructed.” 
It indicates that the “problem” of remanence has been understood 
since the early 1960s. The Department of Defense’s Clearing and 
Sanitization Matrix (DoD 5220.22-M) articulates a range of solutions 
for various magnetic and optical storage media, including degauss-
ing and overwriting the media with random patterns. For the most 
sensitive materials, the recommendation is to “disintegrate, inciner-
ate, pulverize, shred, or melt.” (Cathode-ray tube displays are also to 
be inspected for burn-in, and scraps from paper shredders are to be 
destroyed.) In the civilian sector, by contrast, computer storage me-
dia are often discarded without even basic steps toward sanitization. 
Garfinkel and Shelat (2003) surveyed 158 hard drives acquired on the 
secondary market and found that the vast majority contained at least 
some sensitive data accessible through minimal effort.
In 1996, Peter Gutmann, a researcher at the University of Auck-
land, disseminated a widely read paper entitled “Secure Deletion of 
Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory.”  He detailed a then-
obscure data-recovery process known as magnetic force microscopy 
(MFM), which uses a variation on the scanning tunneling electron 
microscope to image patterns of magnetic fluctuation on the surfaces 
of computer storage media. 
Using MFM technology, Gutmann suggested, an investiga-
tor could exploit both the hysteretic properties of magnetic media 
and registration problems resulting in palimpsest-like deposits of 
magnetic data (a function of the drive head never writing in exactly 
the same place twice) to reconstruct files that had been subjected to 
Fig. 2.2: Magnetic Force Microscopy 
image of data on the surface of a hard 
disk; the area depicted is one micron  
square. Wikimedia Commons.
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many generations of overwrites. The dramatic implication was that 
data might be recovered from any magnetic medium that had not 
been subjected to total physical destruction, and that, moreover, the 
practice might be far more common than acknowledged: “Even for 
a relatively inexperienced user the time to start getting images of the 
data on a drive platter is about 5 minutes. To start getting useful im-
ages of a particular track requires more than a passing knowledge of 
disk formats, but these are well-documented, and once the correct 
location on the platter is found a single image would take approxi-
mately 2–10 minutes depending on the skill of the operator and the 
resolution required.” To counter this supposed capability, Gutmann 
detailed 35 different sequences of random data designed to system-
atically overcome the hysteretic tendencies of magnetic media and 
reset their polarity back to neutral, thereby rendering MFM ineffec-
tive. These 35 patterns have since become canonical, and many disk-
erasure utilities include them as an option.
The benefits of going to such extremes, however, are dubious, 
and the exact capabilities of MFM are still not widely understood. 
The technique probably has more application in industry (for study 
of the integrity of magnetic media) than in forensic investigation. 
The simple truth is that no documented instances of a complete file 
retrieved via MFM sampling are known to exist. A recent paper by 
Wright, Kleiman, and Sundhar (2008) argues that Gutmann’s con-
clusions are overblown, and demonstrates that in practice it seldom 
takes more than one pass (“wipe”) to sanitize a magnetic hard disk. 
While reading this recondite literature may make the archivist feel 
a little like a character on CSI, a basic understanding of the physi-
cal properties of magnetic and other storage media is essential for 
anyone responsible for born-digital collections. It also serves to 
Fig. 2.3: Available settings in a common 
Windows file erase utility, showing options 
for various Department of Defense 
standards-compliant overwrites, as well 
as the 35 Gutmann patterns.
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demystify computer storage media, since even information that is 
not visible to the naked eye (nor legible to us if it were) is still a part 
of the physical, material world and thereby subject to its laws.
2.5.2.	File	Systems	
Hysteresis and the physical properties of computer storage media are 
the foundation for understanding what data recovery can and cannot 
do, but the archivist also requires a working knowledge of computer 
file systems and their relationship to different operating systems. 
Many users know that when they delete a file from their trash or re-
cycle bin it is not immediately expunged from their hard drive. The 
“delete” command simply tells the file system to make the clusters 
associated with a given file available again for future use (a special 
hex character [E5h]) is affixed to the beginning of the file name), but 
the data stay intact on the platter. This explains the standard injunc-
tion to allow as little time as possible to elapse before attempting to 
restore a lost file. File-recovery utilities work by removing the special 
character and restoring a file’s status as allocated clusters. Because a 
file’s physical storage location will change each time it is opened and 
modified, its earlier incarnations will also persist until such time as 
those data may be overwritten. It is not the case that as hard drive 
capacities continue to increase, information will persist for longer 
and longer periods of time on the surface of the disk: the writing and 
rewriting of data to storage is not evenly distributed. Even on a very 
large drive, a great deal of data may be overwritten very quickly if 
the operations performed on the machine over time follow consistent 
patterns. For example, the data on a Web server may be overwritten 
very quickly, even if the hard drive is huge, because the HTTP opera-
tions use similar spots on the drive.
The layperson’s view of a file system—accessed from the desk-
top through standard directory structures and tree menus—is both 
optimized and impoverished, a partial and simplistic window onto 
the diverse data deposits that have accumulated on the media. Creat-
ing a file and saving it to a hard drive does not yield a simple, one-
to-one correspondence between the file and its record on the disk. 
This fact gives rise to what is sometimes known as ambient data. For 
example, word processors and other productivity software routinely 
include an auto-save function that writes a temporary snapshot of 
an open file to the disk at set intervals. Most computers also use a 
portion of their hard disk as an extension of their RAM, a type of 
storage known as virtual memory or swap space. Forensic investiga-
tors recover all manner of otherwise “ephemeral” matter, including 
passwords and encryption keys, from the swap space. So-called slack 
space (not to be confused with swap space) presents yet another op-
portunity for extracting remnants of supposedly long-discarded files: 
data on a magnetic hard drive are stored in clusters of a fixed length 
(4096 bytes is typical for NTFS and FAT file systems). This is what 
accounts for the discrepancy between the actual size of a file and its 
“size on disk,” as revealed by Windows Properties; even a 1-byte 
file—a single ASCII character—will require the allocation of a full 
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cluster, 4096 bytes, to store. But since files themselves are rarely the 
exact same size, and hence occupy variable numbers of clusters, it is 
also frequently possible to find the partial remains of earlier files at 
the end of a cluster chain, a phenomenon known as slack.
A skilled investigator develops instincts for where slack space is 
to be found. In addition to temporary copies and other multiples of 
the actual file, metadata (the name of the file, the file type, date- and 
time-stamps) proliferate even more aggressively through the oper-
ating system. Therefore, even if the content of a file has been com-
pletely erased it is still possible to recover evidence that testifies to its 
past presence. 
The interactions of modern productivity software and mature 
physical storage media such as a hard drive may finally resemble a 
cybernetic pinball machine, with a single, simple input by the user 
sending files careening through the internal mechanisms of the op-
erating system, these files leaving persistent versions of themselves 
behind at every point they touch—like afterimages that only gradu-
ally fade—and the persistent versions themselves creating versions 
that multiply in a like manner through the system. There is, in short, 
no simple way to know how many instances of a “single” file are 
residing in how many states in how many locations at any given 
moment in the operating system. Likewise, there is no simple way 
to know how many metadata records of a file (or any of its ambient 
versions) exist. For these reasons, it is not hard to see why one expert 
concludes that “secure file deletion on Windows platforms is a major 
Fig. 2.4: A hex utility revealing the text of 
a “deleted” document on a Windows file 
system.
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exercise, and can only be part of a secure ‘wipe’ of one’s entire hard 
disk. Anything less than that is likely to leave discoverable electronic 
evidence behind” (Caloyannides 2001, 28). Other platforms, includ-
ing Linux and the Mac OS, present their own challenges and idiosyn-
crasies in this regard. 
2.5.3.	Forensics
A number of software tools and utilities are now available that al-
low a trained forensic investigator to exploit these conditions. Pre-
cise features and capabilities are covered in Appendix A. One com-
mon method, known as data carving, treats the data deposited on 
the physical media as an entity that can be searched and examined 
regardless of abstractions imposed by the file system. Data stored in 
slack space (as described above), for example, become visible and 
accessible to the forensic software’s search-and-discovery functions. 
An archivist will need to become familiar with the conventions of 
hexadecimal notation, which provides a mapping of data’s physical 
location on the media in question. Once we are no longer accessing 
and retrieving files via the operating system, we can examine frag-
ments of files that are missing their identifying headers or other key 
structural elements. Thus, while some portions of a file may have 
been overwritten, other pieces may persist elsewhere on the media. 
These would not be discoverable through the normal operating 
system. Likewise, dispersed fragments of image files may be recon-
structed through the viewers in various forensics packages, even if 
the file in its entirety cannot be retrieved. Hex itself is nothing more 
than a shorthand convenience, a concession to the human visual 
system as a way of notating binary numbers (which are themselves 
symbolic or shorthand conveniences for voltage differentials in the 
computer’s circuitry). With practice, one can use a hex editor to pin-
point and inspect the bytes recorded at any location on the virtual 
surface of the disk image. Likewise, strings of character data can be 
searched and mined through automated retrieval. A skilled inves-
tigator can also draw conclusions about the time when particular 
files were created, modified, and perhaps deleted on the basis of an 
evaluation of the contents of the disk’s slack space. This procedure 
is known as digital stratigraphy, and dramatically makes the point 
that digital inscription is ultimately a physical and material pro-
cess, not so different from the manner in which a conservator can 
reconstruct a palimpsest of writing from a physical piece of paper or 
parchment.
One can also discover a wide array of information that is em-
bedded in an individual file but not always visible when rendering 
the file through its default application. Such information includes 
comments within the code, stored rules and styles, change-tracking 
information, metadata (often stored in file headers), executable code 
(including viruses), and other information that a user intended to 
remove (“crop”) from a file. The Microsoft Office suite offers a case in 
point. Forms of data that may be hidden from users include informa-
tion about the application used to create a document; authors, user 
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names, organizational affiliations, and author history; comments; 
custom properties; database queries; embedded objects (OLE); Fast 
Save—that is, change history appended to the end of a file, rather 
than applied to the body of a document; the GUID (Globally Unique 
Identifier) for the originating computer; hidden cells, slides, and text 
(purposely hidden but then possibly forgotten); Outlook (e-mail) 
properties and routing slips; path information, including audio and 
video paths, author history, linked objects, printers, hyperlinks, and 
included fields; presentation notes; printer driver information; RSID 
(Revision Save ID), which differentiates changes from different edit-
ing sessions); tracked changes (added to PowerPoint and Excel in 
Office XP) versions; Visual Basic code, including macros and viruses 
(and the identity of the code’s creators); Web server information; 
and white text (on white background).34 Thus, regardless of how an 
archivist chooses to handle the recovery of slack data associated with 
disk images, she will likely still have an ethical obligation to address 
many forms of hidden data within the files themselves.
Beyond files and file systems, an archivist may need to acquire 
at least a basic familiarity with the registry. On Windows machines, 
the registry is a database that maintains configuration information 
about applications and devices attached to the computer. (Other sys-
tems lack the equivalent of a registry and store their configuration 
information in different formats, often plain text.) Specific holdings 
within the registry are stored in binary arrangements known as keys. 
Examples of information that can be gleaned from an exploration 
of the registry keys (using tools such as “regedit”) include paths 
to external drives that are or have at one time been mounted on 
the system, settings for program applications, and lists of recently 
opened or saved files. Mastering the cryptic confines of the registry 
is a subspecialty all its own, and one should never access the registry 
of a system that has not been properly duplicated for risk of doing 
irreparable damage. Carvey (2009) has written the best guide to date 
to forensic analysis of the Windows registry. 
2.5.4.	Conclusions
The erasure and recovery of data go to the heart of some of our most 
cherished considerations of what it means to have a cultural record. 
Presence and absence of information is not simply an ambient or ac-
cidental condition, but rather one that may be managed and imposed 
through the selective use of procedures and tools. The sheer volume 
of data available on computer storage media, coupled with the ex-
tent to which computers function as the locus for many different 
aspects of our lives, promotes these considerations to new levels of 
urgency. Data recovery also collides directly with questions of inten-
tionality, and, therefore, with issues of personal privacy and archival 
ethics. It seems likely, therefore, that policies regarding data recovery 
and forensic exploration will have to become part of future donor 
agreements, so that an originator’s intentions are rendered as unam-
biguously as possible. 
34 Our thanks to Cal Lee for this list of potential hidden information in MS Office files.
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Clearly there will also be situations in which even a donor’s 
stated intentions may not be the final determining factor. The Free-
dom of Information Act, subpoenas, or other legal instruments may 
impinge on a donor’s intentions. Societal attitudes may change, such 
that given sufficient passage of time the potential value of informa-
tion may outweigh whatever restrictions were once placed upon its 
use. (Who among us could say that if we discovered one of Shake-
speare’s missing manuscripts today we would forgo the opportunity 
to resurrect the lost text of a play, even if we somehow knew it was 
against the Bard’s intentions?) It is also worth understanding that not 
all potential for data recovery lies with archivists: a patron with ac-
cess to bit stream disk images, for example, may be able to undertake 
a forensic exploration without the knowledge of the archivist. This, 
too, must be considered as repositories decide about what kinds of 
access to born-digital materials to provide scholars.
2.6. Costing 
The costs of providing an infrastructure for digital forensics are not yet 
well understood; however, several projects and institutions have pro-
duced reports describing their investigations into the costs of digital 
preservation. The CEDARS Project, the Digital Preservation Coalition, 
the British Library, the Koninklijke Bibliotheek, the National Archives, 
and the LIFE (Life Cycle Information for E-Literature) Project have all 
made contributions to our understanding of the financial commitment 
needed to support the long-term preservation of digital content.
The LIFE2 Model (2008) delineates life cycle and non–life cycle 
costs. Life cycle costs are those associated with the processes neces-
sary to preserve digital objects and can be summarized as follows:
• acquisition
• ingest
• bit stream preservation
• content preservation
• access
Each of these main headings can be broken into subareas, all of 
which carry cost elements and can be used to generate a formulaic 
approach to estimating the preservation costs of digital objects.
Non–life cycle costs are those that relate to the management and 
maintenance of the repository: management, inflation, hardware, 
and software.
Main heading Subareas
Acquisition Selection, intellectual property rights, licensing, ordering and invoicing, obtaining, check-in
Ingest Quality assurance, metadata, deposit, holdings update, reference linking
Bit Stream Preservation Repository administration, storage provision, refreshment, backup, inspection
Content Preservation Preservation watch, preservation planning, preservation action, reingest, disposal
Access Access provision, access control, user support
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The cost headings developed for the LIFE and LIFE2 models are 
applicable across the broad array of materials held in digital reposi-
tories, ranging from Web archives to collections of digitized images.35 
The models are sensitive enough to cope with complex digital collec-
tions, especially personal digital materials, which are likely to con-
tain items that an archivist might need to submit to forensic analysis 
in order to render a file’s inherent information in an accessible form 
or to determine whether other modes of intervention have taken 
place on the materials.
The work done on costs to date has largely ignored the specific 
expenditures associated with digital forensics, although many of 
the generic headings in the LIFE costing model can subsume digital 
forensic actions. For example, subareas under acquisition, the first 
main heading, may include arrangements over intellectual property 
rights (IPR) and licensing that may be need to be worked out before 
forensic analysis can take place. The actions associated with check-
in, another subarea under acquisition, include verification actions, 
but under the LIFE2 model these processes are fairly simple, often 
including only a manual verification of the content, and could not be 
categorized as actions that are specific to the field of digital forensics. 
Under the metadata subarea, which is part of the ingest main 
heading, are file-format validation and integrity-check actions in-
tended to provide automated matching of the content with the speci-
fications of the format the content purports to be. These actions may 
include verification that the content is valid and well formed. They 
may also include (sampled) manual checking that the content ren-
ders with the access software currently provided by the organization 
or commonly employed by users, but again go no further to ascertain 
the provenance of the digital materials in a more rigorous fashion. 
Under bit stream preservation, the third main heading, a series 
of tasks falls under the subheading of repository administration, in-
cluding the maintenance of security systems to preserve the integrity 
of the materials stored in the repository and accessed by scholars. 
Again, however, there may be circumstances in which extremely 
sophisticated and expensive security systems may be required to 
ensure the integrity of preserved material. Also under the heading of 
bit stream preservation, LIFE2 posits under the subheading of inspec-
tion a series of automated and manual actions designed to provide 
automated auditing of stored objects to ensure that regenerated 
checksums match previously stored checksums (thus verifying that 
the content remains unchanged) and, through manual inspection, 
to ensure that they can be retrieved and rendered as expected. Al-
though these actions are necessary to ensure the integrity of material 
in a routine digital repository, there are likely to be circumstances in 
which they are insufficient to provide an appropriate level of assur-
ance that highly sensitive and important digital content has not been 
interfered with in any unauthorized fashion. 
35 More information about LIFE2 is available at http://www.life.ac.uk/2/.
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Under the content preservation heading, the cost of maintaining 
systems to enable technological changes to be tracked, and to plan 
future preservation actions, as well as identifying occasions when 
reingesting digital objects may be required, is likely to be signifi-
cant, even when institutions can collaborate in areas like technology 
watch.
Finally, under the access heading, provision of access controls is 
identified as a significant subheading for costs. Here, again, the mod-
el assumes that security systems can be maintained relatively simply 
by a systems administrator working for a limited number of hours 
per month. The provision of robust and trustworthy access-control 
systems for important and sensitive material will undoubtedly re-
quire a greater degree of effort than this, and is likely to require a 
greater financial commitment.
In summary, the existing methodologies that advise institutions 
of the costs of maintaining digital repository systems, including the 
most widely accepted methodology, the LIFE2 model, are probably 
too generic to provide anything more than broad guidance about 
the costs of acquiring, capturing, managing, securing, and providing 
controlled access to sensitive digital information. The report of the 
Blue Ribbon Task Force on Sustainable Digital Preservation and Ac-
cess, published in February 2010 and entitled Sustainable Economics 
for a Digital Planet: Ensuring Long-Term Access to Digital Information, 
provides a higher-level view of the economic factors driving the 
provision of digital infrastructure. The report emphasizes the need 
to express value propositions clearly so that necessary resources 
can be directed toward the curation of digital objects. The task force 
recommends a number of societal changes to ensure that sufficient 
incentives for digital curation are in place. But the report also notes 
that although skilled staff, the creation of economies of scale, and 
the development of public-private partnerships may help organiza-
tions that are involved in digital curation, technical developments 
designed to lower the costs of digital preservation and determine the 
optimal level of technical curation are also necessary.
The level of technical and organizational commitment required 
to develop capacity and competence in the area of digital forensics 
is likely to be high for the foreseeable future according to myriad 
reports published over the past 15 years. The number of institutions 
capable of delivering this level of technical competence and organi-
zational capacity over a sustained period will continue to be small, 
and the financial resources required by these few will likely be great-
er than what most institutions need to fulfill their existing levels of 
commitment to maintain the basic infrastructure required for digital 
preservation and access.
3. Ethics
The notion that the archivist (and, by extension, the archives) is a 
neutral and independent participant in the scholarly process, whose 
function can be trusted by all who use a given repository, has been 
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challenged by numerous historians, philosophers, theorists, and 
others as scholars and archivists have come to acknowledge the sub-
jectivity inherent in the acts of collection, appraisal, organization, 
and description.36 Within the archives profession, some of the most 
important ethical issues in the digital era relate to an archivist’s priv-
ileged access to the born-digital materials of an individual or orga-
nization. Archivists have always been in this position of power, but 
over the centuries the development of professional ethics, combined 
with the growth of the archival profession, has created structures to 
prevent its abuse. The arrival of born-digital materials in archives 
highlights the need for archivists and other professionals who work 
with these items to have a more nuanced understanding of profes-
sional ethics.  
As born-digital materials become commonplace within libraries 
and archives, the librarian’s and the archivist’s commitment to pro-
fessional ethics is being tested under a new and constantly changing 
set of technical circumstances. The prevalence of digital technologies 
has spurred a renewed interest in these professions and a need for 
staff from fields other than information studies. Staff whose back-
grounds are in commerce, industry, technology, and other fields may 
not be familiar with the professional culture of the librarian and ar-
chivist. This lack of exposure to the traditionally trusted routes into 
the profession, which provide training regimes and cultivate a cer-
tain professional ethos, may necessitate additional on-the-job train-
ing in professional ethics specific to libraries and archives. An addi-
tional benefit of an influx of talent and insight from other disciplines 
may be that librarians and archivists are challenged to examine their 
own assumptions about the functions of privacy, information, tech-
nology, access, and ethics in the digital age. 
Key to the ethical culture of librarians and archivists has been 
the notion of “curation,” a concept that has derived from the mu-
seum community and some large library and archival institutions. 
The digital library and archives communities have recently adopted 
the term to refer to the management of digital materials through 
their life cycle.37 The traditional curator of books and manuscripts 
has been involved in the complete archival cycle, from selection to 
acquisition; to appraisal, listing, and cataloging; to providing access 
through inquiries, Web publication, and exhibitions. Regional varia-
tions in traditional curatorial duties, as well as differences at the lo-
cal level between repositories, mean that not all curators undertake 
the same type of work. In some repositories, for example, curators 
select, acquire, and interpret materials (e.g., via exhibition or answer-
ing inquiries), but the work of appraisal, cataloging, and description 
is left to archivists. The digital curator, regardless of job title, is the 
person who manages the capture and long-term preservation of the 
digital object and has the best sense of the provenance of a particular 
document, as well as the skills and knowledge needed to advise the 
36 See Light and Hyry 2002, and Steedman 2002.
37 See http://www.dcc.ac.uk/digital-curation/what-digital-curation (accessed 7 
September 2010).
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scholar on issues such as authenticity and documentary integrity. 
Today’s digital curators, and those of the future, will need to adapt 
their skill sets to the nature of the born-digital materials in their cus-
tody, and strive for the same level of understanding and competence 
as curators had in the traditional era. Among the skills to foster will 
be even closer working relationships with data creators and deposi-
tors, although this kind of activity will be possible only for libraries 
and archives with sufficient staffing resources to deal with these is-
sues on a personal basis.
The work being done with the Salman Rushdie Papers at Emory 
University highlights a key ethical issue facing digital archivists: the 
presence of personal digital materials provides an opportunity, when 
staff deploy the tools of digital forensics, to access the personal digi-
tal histories of the individuals whose collections they are curating. 
In caring for Salman Rushdie’s digital literary manuscripts, those 
responsible for digital collections could potentially access significant 
portions of his personal Web history, for example, revealing behav-
ior that was never intended to be disclosed to any other individual. 
Such access could not only uncover online behaviors but also expose 
financial and medical information of a highly confidential nature. 
These ethical concerns operate at the level of both the individual 
digital curator and the institution. If a staff member has access to 
sensitive personal information, this may leave the creator at risk of 
personal hostile action such as violation of privacy, blackmail, or 
theft. At the institutional level, inadvertent exposure of such infor-
mation to scholars or the public may engender serious risk of loss of 
trust; the owner or creator of the digital content may request that her 
materials be removed from the repository or embark on legal action 
against the institution. An understanding of these ethical concerns 
and established mechanisms by which to address them must be em-
bedded in the organization’s professional culture, in its employment 
policies and staff handbooks, in the managerial regimes that monitor 
the behavior of staff, and in the transparency and public availability 
of a repository's policies governing the transfer, preservation, man-
agement, and delivery of potentially sensitive materials.
3.1. Security Issues
Security is a major concern for the creators and owners of archives. 
The ease and speed with which digital materials can be accessed, 
copied, and communicated have created a culture of fear among 
many depositors and staff members. In the past, sensitive material 
could be separated from “open” material, often in boxes with physi-
cal seals. Sometimes these items were excluded from published 
catalogs or finding aids available to researchers in the reading room. 
As the result of serious leaks (of e-mails in particular), research has 
found that digital information is perceived to be more vulnerable 
to unwarranted access and more likely to be tampered with than 
its paper counterpart (see Mayer-Schönberger 2009). Furthermore, 
the culture of social networking has encouraged a growing public 
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unease surrounding notions of privacy. Archives and libraries also 
have to deal with evolving attitudes about freedom of information 
and expectations of accountability and the access to “public” infor-
mation (that is, information related to activities of the state or bodies 
and individuals funded by the state or by taxpayers). The experience 
of the team at Oxford working on the Paradigm Project with active 
politicians revealed a fear among this group of data creators that 
confidential information could be hacked through insecure univer-
sity networks and over inadequate firewalls and released into the 
public domain, potentially causing political damage to the individu-
als concerned and their political parties (see, for example, section 3 
of the Paradigm Workbook). Such fears have encouraged creators of 
archives to destroy information rather than allow it to be kept in un-
safe regimes, and even to ask that information be stored on servers 
that are physically unconnected to the Internet and locked in strong 
rooms along with rare books and medieval manuscripts. Only with 
such extreme physical measures will some data creators be satisfied 
with the security arrangements for their archives.
3.1.1.	 Access	Controls	and	Oversight	of	Use
Depositors of archives often have control over access at the forefront 
of their minds when assessing the trustworthiness of a repository. 
For the archivist and librarian, personal relationships are just as im-
portant as technical arrangements when trying to engender a sense 
of trust in a repository. Staff must be able to demonstrate that the 
digital materials placed in their care under access controls cannot be 
accessed without permission. This will take the form of:
•	 Provision of clear information to users and of training and instruc-
tions for staff to ensure that restricted archives are managed ap-
propriately.
•	 Controls to ensure that access by authorized users is automatically 
recorded by the repository system and can be retrieved and easily 
produced as documentary evidence.
•	 Controls on users so that records, when accessed under the opera-
tion of permissions, are not misused. This may involve requiring 
authorized users to sign disclaimers and not allowing them to 
copy or remove electronic records from the archival repository 
(e.g., allowing only handwritten notes to be taken when accessing 
digital archives in a reading room).
•	 Controls on collections to ensure that they cannot be accessed 
surreptitiously and without authorization. For digital archives, 
this means building a digital infrastructure that supports security 
mechanisms (e.g., management of firewalls) and other aspects 
of good practice to avoid unauthorized entry into controlled 
systems. Within the specialist aspects of digital repositories, this 
means a range of activities that include the creation, publication, 
and maintenance of policies making it clear that unauthorized use 
is prohibited, and that legal constraints (such as those that operate 
under data-protection laws) are taken seriously and, when appro-
priate, policed.
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In many instances, engendering trust will be the only way to 
convince data creators that their information is secure. Ultimately, 
the reputation of individual repositories and their staff may have 
to carry sufficient weight to convey the assurances that are needed. 
Over time, archival repositories will be able to demonstrate a track 
record of keeping digital information safe and secure. Recent high-
profile lapses in security (such as the leaking of e-mails from climate 
change scientists at the University of East Anglia) have been from 
within essentially unmanaged systems. A key test will be whether 
potential depositors of digital material with the University of East 
Anglia’s archives will be dissuaded from transferring their materials 
because of the damage to that institution’s reputation inflicted by the 
climate change affair (G. Marshall 2009).
Value is another aspect to consider. At present, most digital 
information has no commercial value in the same sense that, for ex-
ample, a copy of the first folio of Shakespeare or a collection of mod-
ern literary manuscripts by a famous writer might command. This is 
partly because of the perception that e-mail archives and collections 
of word-processed documents lack the tangible appeal of a paper or 
parchment collection. Born-digital materials will be understood to 
possess a significant monetary value once their affordances become 
more widely known. At that point, the organizations and individuals 
charged with their care will have to pay even closer attention to se-
curity. As digital archival materials gain traction in the marketplace, 
security violations will no longer be simply a matter of reputation, 
but will indicate a financial loss for the custodial institution, possibly 
triggering insurance claims and other financial consequences. Inter-
nal management systems are likely to create tighter security in situa-
tions in which financial loss is a possible outcome of lax security.
3.2. Privacy
3.2.1.		Conduct	and	Confidentiality
Privacy is at the heart of the ethical issues surrounding born-digital 
materials. The Salman Rushdie Papers at Emory University, which 
consist of both paper and born-digital materials, illustrate the im-
portance of privacy and provide an example of how custodians at 
one repository have worked with a creator to provide a satisfactory 
level of security while also allowing researchers a reasonable level of 
access. “Privacy was the major issue for me,” Rushdie explained, de-
scribing as “exhaustive” the conditions under which he allowed his 
born-digital materials to be made publicly available (Loftus 2010b). 
The professional team at Emory faced a considerable challenge in 
working with Rushdie to secure his privacy, while also meeting 
the preservation and access needs central to the library’s mission. 
“University librarians, archivists and legal experts have worked 
with [Rushdie] every step of the way to determine what must be 
kept confidential—and for how long,” Mary J. Loftus wrote in her 
article about the project (Loftus 2010a). “We have to find a balance 
between protecting his privacy and providing significant content to 
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researchers who would find value from it,” elaborated Lisa Macklin, 
coordinator of Emory University Libraries’ IPR office (Loftus 2010a). 
E-mail and born-digital manuscript materials are among the items 
researchers can access from an Emory reading room, either by using 
a database or by interacting directly with an emulated version of one 
of Rushdie’s computers.
 The security of personal digital information is covered by 
the term information privacy. The ease with which privacy can be 
infringed is causing some individuals to exercise a new concept, 
known as digital abstinence, defined as the avoidance of putting per-
sonal information into digital form and thereby making it subject to 
copying and distribution actions that place at risk the information 
privacy of an individual (Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 134-154). Ap-
proaches such as digital abstinence create significant problems for 
scholars, librarians, and archivists interested in reconstructing a per-
son’s digital life. But even if a person resolutely avoids putting per-
sonal information online, she has no control over the conditions un-
der which other people expose her information: for example, banks 
may keep their clients’ personal information on networked servers, 
or a business owner may use a networked database to manage or-
ders she receives in the mail. The emerging social and cultural cli-
mate with respect to digital information, and especially cloud-based 
personal digital information, is creating a culture of fear around un-
authorized disclosure at many levels. First, criminal activity increas-
ingly targets personal digital information for identity theft, either to 
gain access to bank accounts and credit card accounts to steal money 
or, more broadly, to appropriate identities for criminal activities such 
as falsifying passports and other official documentation. 
Members of the public in many Western societies increasingly 
see governments’ use of cyberwarfare techniques as a threat, and 
there is growing unease about the way publicly accessible per-
sonal information in social networking sites such as Facebook and 
MySpace may be accessed and manipulated by foreign powers (see 
Mayer-Schönberger 2009). These concerns may be unfounded, and 
to some extent stimulated by the West for political purposes, but 
they nonetheless represent a genuine fear on behalf of some sectors 
of the public in Western democracies. The experience of Google in 
China is seen as an example of the conflict of interest between the 
commercially driven Western model, characterized by open com-
munication through the Internet, and that of a Communist society 
that uses censorship and state regulation of communication systems 
as a tool for social and political control. Google originally attempted 
to work alongside Chinese authorities to address the issues of state 
censorship of information discovery systems, but Western public and 
political unease about this strategy led the company to adopt a more 
overtly moral stance (Brannigan 2010). 
Another aspect of social networking that must be considered in 
relation to concerns over privacy relates to using aliases. Since the 
inception of the Internet, many individuals have preferred to use 
aliases to protect their identity. This practice could cause problems 
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for archivists, digital curators, and researchers interested in identify-
ing the various online presences, such as blog postings or a Facebook 
page, of individuals whose papers are in a repository’s collection. 
For example, if a writer dies without leaving any documentary re-
cord of her aliases, it might be difficult for the repository to create a 
full picture of her online communities. Likewise, an archivist taking 
responsibility for a particular digital collection of a living individual 
will need to consider the ethical issues involved in revealing the 
true identity of a person who uses an alias online. Another possibil-
ity poses serious ethical implications: because computers and other 
media can contain traces of a user’s Internet activity, including user-
names and passwords, it might be possible for a digital archivist to 
discover a creator’s alias and either reveal her true identity or use 
the information to gain access to server-based e-mail accounts, social 
networking sites, and the like. Examples such as these drive home 
how important it is for a prospective donor to work with repository 
staff to craft an agreement that lays out explicitly what digital infor-
mation she intends to transfer to the repository and to what uses it 
may be put (see the sidebar on “Donor Agreements”).
3.2.2.	Recruitment,	Training,	and	Encouragement	of	Staff
The archival mission is one that balances immediate over long-term 
issues, where the demands of creators and users of archives in the 
short term must be weighed against the needs of the materials as 
well as the projected long-term demands of future users and of soci-
ety as a whole. In the paper era, one manifestation of these issues has 
been the classic tension between preservation and access. A common 
strategy for balancing these concerns is evident in the decisions often 
made by archivists to hold information for long periods of time, even 
though it will not be publicly accessible for many years. In the Unit-
ed Kingdom, this is classically exemplified in the various stipula-
tions of the 1958 Public Records Act, where classes of public records 
were designated as being subject to closure regimes, such as the 
“thirty-year rule,” or longer periods where Official Secrets or Public 
Honours were concerned. Although this information would con-
tinue to hold a long-term interest, legal and other custodial pressures 
have enforced a rigorous ethic within the archival community that 
“closed,” “embargoed,” or “restricted” collections should remain so, 
and that the archivists themselves should exercise the same levels 
of discretion over access to this information. In the digital age, the 
means of controlling access to collections that fall into this category 
becomes more problematic as the physical barriers of the paper era, 
controlled by lock and key, give way to digital information housed 
on servers that ideally are both physically and virtually secure. In 
this latter case, trusted archivists may well have access through 
digital asset management systems to archival data that are closed to 
other individuals. Regimes of oversight, including automated access 
logs that are routinely monitored by senior staff, will be required to 
maintain appropriate levels of internal vigilance.
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3.3. Working with Data Creators
The introduction of forensic techniques to the archives profession 
means that archivists can capture and preserve more information 
by and about creators than ever before. Current ethical practices for 
paper materials vary by repository and nation, but are generally 
geared toward ensuring that sensitive information protected either 
by law (e.g., Social Security numbers, financial information, educa-
tion records, medical records) or by contract (e.g., restricted personal 
content) is not made available to the public. The same concerns ap-
ply for born-digital items, but the complex nature of digital materials 
presents new challenges for creators who want to prune their files of 
sensitive content before transferring them to an archival repository. 
Levels of comfort with technology vary widely, and many creators 
will not have the skills necessary to locate and delete certain kinds of 
information from their own born-digital materials prior to transfer.38 
To foster and maintain mutually beneficial working relationships 
with data creators, archival repositories that accept born-digital ma-
terials and use forensic methods to preserve them must make their 
methodologies transparent and, when possible, must work with cre-
ators to ensure that they understand what they are transferring and 
how it may be used. 
Until fairly recently, most born-digital materials arrived at ar-
chives as part of larger accessions consisting primarily of paper 
materials, transferred by a creator at the culmination of his or her ca-
reer.39 In this way, many repositories have accumulated a significant 
volume of born-digital materials. The paper items in these collec-
tions have been processed in accordance with deeds of gift, but these 
contracts were likely written without born-digital materials in mind 
and may not specify preservation and access restrictions for sensitive 
digital files. The default action has been to apply the same strictures 
to digital content as to paper materials; however, this solution does 
not address the unique forms of digital information that can be gath-
ered using forensic techniques. 
Forensic methods of capture create a bit-for-bit image of a floppy 
disk, hard disk drive, or other digital media. This forensic image rep-
licates exactly all areas of the disk, including files often not preserved 
by other means. These captured files can comprise unallocated sec-
tors containing information from deleted files, registry files contain-
ing username and password information and a record of Internet 
searches, and other kinds of files. It would be possible for creators to 
identify and manage this information for themselves, on the original 
media and prior to transfer to a repository, by using the command 
line or forensic analysis tools (both open-source and proprietary 
options are available online; see Appendix A); however, it seems 
38 It is equally likely that some creators will not care what digital files they send to the 
repository or what is done with them.
39 See the collection development section of the Paradigm Workbook for an informative 
breakdown and exposition of different acquisition methods. Available at http://www.
paradigm.ac.uk/workbook/collection-development/index.html (accessed 19 April 
2010).
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When acquiring materials from individuals, col-lecting institutions traditionally rely on writ-ten donor agreements to clarify and docu-
ment donor expectations about the management of and 
access to the materials. The language used in existing 
donor agreements is rarely specific enough to resolve 
the ethical issues described in this report. 
Currently missing from most acquisition activities are 
mechanisms for eliciting the specific “curatorial intent” 
of donors with respect to a given set of materials—that 
is, what properties of the materials an archivist should 
be sure to reproduce over time, even if technology 
changes, and what forms of access to the materials the 
archivist should allow. 
One of the primary challenges of eliciting curatorial in-
tent stems from the fact that digital resources are not 
simply composed of the information visible to the do-
nor on the screen the last time he or she viewed a set of 
documents. Instead, digital resources comprise interact-
ing components that can be considered and accessed at 
different levels of representation:
• a bit stream (series of 1s and 0s) as it resides on a 
physical storage device;
• a bit stream as it is read from the storage device using 
a particular combination of input-output (I/O) hard-
ware and software;
• a small data structure that can be accessed using spe-
cialized software (below the file-system level)—for 
example, information about the deletion of a file or 
information within a photograph that indicates what 
kind of camera was used to take it; 
• a file as read through the file system (i.e., the way a 
user typically interacts with the system by clicking 
on folders and files to open them);
• a discrete digital object as experienced through a 
particular application, for example, a photograph or 
simple text document;
• a composite document that is composed of multiple 
files, such as a Web page with embedded images or 
an e-mail with an attachment; and
• a larger aggregation of content, such as an entire Web 
site or e-mail account. 
Professionals responsible for the care of digital materials 
will need to expand the traditional notion of a donor 
agreement to address the various forms of representa-
tion that are manifested in digital objects. Fundamen-
tal questions to address in such an agreement are as 
follows:
• Exactly what does the donor intend to transfer to the 
repository? For example, does she want to transfer 
the whole bit stream on a floppy disk, or just the 
files from it? The entire Microsoft Outlook .pst file 
(including saved and sent messages, calendar items, 
draft and deleted messages, address book, and pos-
sibly viruses), or only a selection of messages from 
it?
• What types or levels of representation are particu-
larly sensitive to the parties represented in the mate-
rials? Many parties other than the donor (e.g., indi-
viduals in pictures, correspondents within an e-mail 
thread, intellectual property rights holders) may be 
represented in the materials.
• How might the encoding or rendering decisions 
of a repository promote or violate the interests of 
stakeholders?
Regarding particular types of information within bit 
streams, one could decide to remove the information 
completely at the time of acquisition or to retain it but 
restrict access. A common mechanism for controlling 
sensitive information is to specify in the donor agree-
ment that certain portions of the collection will remain 
closed for a given period of time or until a designated 
trigger event (e.g., the death of a named individual). 
The temporary closing of collections and subcollections 
from public access is likely to remain important; how-
ever, the numerous levels of representation of digital 
materials will require new types of closure arrange-
ments. For example, a repository could provide public 
access to a page-image representation of a Word docu-
ment (e.g., printed to PDF/A) for a limited period, af-
ter which users would be allowed to access the original 
Word bit stream, including various forms of embedded 
information within the file. 
—Cal Lee, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Related Resources
Urls are current as of November 22, 2010
Model Gift Agreement. In Workbook on Digital Private Papers. 
Paradigm Project. Available at http://www.paradigm.ac.uk/
workbook/appendices/gift-agreement.html.
Submission Policy Input Form. Directory of Open Access Re-
positories (OpenDOAR). Available at http://www.sherpa.
ac.uk/OpenDOAR/opendoarsubmissionpolicy.php.
Tufts Accessioning Program for Electronic Records (TAPER). 
Working documents related to Submission Agreements. Avail-
able at http://dca.tufts.edu/?pid=136&c=166.
Variable Media Questionnaire. Available at http://variableme-
diaquestionnaire.net/.
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unlikely that many will be inclined to do so. Deleted files, Internet 
queries, and the like will certainly be of interest to researchers, and 
the ability to recover such information and make it publicly available 
raises questions about the ethical responsibility repositories have to 
the creators whose born-digital materials are in their care. What are 
the implications of this responsibility for collection development and 
acquisition strategies? What are reasonable expectations for a precus-
todial relationship between archivist and creator? Similar questions 
arise regarding access to born-digital materials. If everything can 
be captured from a hard drive, what should be made available to 
researchers? What role should repositories play in helping creators 
make informed decisions about which born-digital materials to re-
strict, if any? (See sections 3.1 and 3.2 for a more in-depth consider-
ation of factors related to security and privacy.) 
The same forensic capabilities that prompt ethics, privacy, and 
security concerns also provide archivists with the means by which to 
isolate and sequester materials specified as restricted in the purchase 
or donation agreement, or even to avoid accessioning certain kinds 
of materials altogether. Software such as EnCase Forensic and Foren-
sic Toolkit (both proprietary) and The Sleuth Kit (open source) fa-
cilitates analysis of the data on disks, hard drives, and other storage 
devices (see Appendix A for a list of these and other options). With 
these tools, archivists can preview and analyze the contents of a disk 
image in order to ascertain what types of files it contains and where 
the likely files of interest reside. Forensic tools can also be used to 
search the contents of a hard drive for keywords (e.g., names, e-mail 
addresses, strings of numbers) and preview files containing graphics 
(e.g., photos). Repositories and creators could use this information 
prior to acquisition to develop a more precise donor agreement—for 
example, specifying that e-mails to and from a particular person be 
restricted until 20 years after the creator’s death, or that deleted and 
hidden files not be preserved—that would establish clear expecta-
tions for both the repository and the creator prior to the official ac-
quisition of a disk image. Another option would be to use forensic 
tools in collaboration with the creator to identify which directories 
on a disk or hard drive she wants to transfer to the repository, and 
then do a targeted capture and acquisition of only those materials. 
The pioneering research done by Cathy Marshall and Jeremy 
Leighton John into the computing and digital archiving habits of 
individuals highlights an area of inquiry with vital implications for 
digital archivists and researchers (Marshall 2008a and b; John et al. 
2010).40 Learning more about the imprint of technology on people’s 
lives will provide insight into the context of the digital archives 
40 Susan Thomas and the Paradigm project team have also argued that repositories 
need to be more directly involved with the creators whose records will soon be in 
their care. See Appendix C of the Workbook for a sample survey that includes questions 
related to the personal management and organization of digital materials. Available at 
http://www.paradigm.ac.uk/workbook/appendices/records-survey.html (accessed 
20 April 2010).
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created now and in the future. Many of these collections will be hy-
brids consisting of a variety of media, such as disks, papers, a hard 
drive, and perhaps even a Blackberry or an iPhone, some of which 
may be related to one another in unexpected ways. For example, in 
2008, the Irish writer Sebastian Barry described sending the closing 
line of a play to the director via text message: “I had pulled the car 
off the road, on some dark backroad of Wicklow,” he said, “and jot-
ted down a last line for the play that had risen up like a trout in the 
river. I texted it to the director ...” (Rochester 2008). If Barry’s cell 
phone or SIM card arrived as part of the materials he transferred to 
a repository, an archivist might be able to use forensic tools, such as 
Paraben’s SIM Card Seizure, to recover Barry’s text message to the 
director. But how meaningful would that text message be without a 
larger context, both in terms of content (why are the words signifi-
cant) and media (how do this digital message and its metadata relate 
to the other materials in the collection)? And perhaps more impor-
tantly, what is a repository’s ethical responsibility when something 
like a SIM card is discovered unexpectedly among other collection 
files and the creator’s intentions with regard to it are unclear? In 
many instances, the only way a repository will be able to learn more 
about the relationships between the various media in a collection 
and ensure that a creator understands the implications of transfer-
ring his or her born-digital materials to a repository is to establish a 
working relationship with the creator prior to formal acquisition. 
Ethical considerations will only increase in complexity as re-
positories begin acquiring more born-digital materials. The promise 
of increased capabilities for information recovery raises the stakes 
for both repositories and creators. To continue to abide by evolving 
professional ethics and maintain respectful working relationships 
with creators, repositories will need to figure out what information 
can be extracted from born-digital materials, how, and to what ends. 
Repositories will also need to make transparent their methodologies 
and policies regarding the preservation of born-digital materials and 
the extent to which they are being made available to researchers. 
Sustained interaction between repository staff and creators will go 
a long way toward establishing archival repositories as trustworthy 
custodians of born-digital materials and ensuring that ethical con-
cerns remain an important part of the transfer process. 
4. Conclusions and Recommendations
Forensics is a Janus-faced word, encompassing seemingly counter-
vailing meanings of verbal persuasion and empirical demonstration. 
Historically and etymologically, this duality is circumscribed by the 
legal sphere in which various forms of evidence and argumentation 
are marshaled before the bench. The long association between law 
and archival science—from Roman law to the emergence of diplo-
matics and the subsequent appearance of legislation governing pub-
lic access to government records in Sweden, France, and elsewhere in 
Enlightenment Europe—suggests it should not be surprising that the 
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tools and methods of digital forensics are creating new possibilities 
for archival practitioners. However, the first and most compelling 
conclusion we have drawn from our research and conversations is 
that over the long term, digital forensics should not simply be im-
ported and adopted in toto into manuscript archives and the broader 
cultural heritage and scholarly communities. 
Given the popular connotations of “forensics” with CSI and 
the like, the mere appearance of the term may prove problematic 
in certain settings—particularly if an author or originator is within 
earshot. (As Clifford Lynch asked of the attendees at the Maryland 
symposium, “How many of you would like to be the subject of a fo-
rensic investigation?”) The Manuscripts, Archives, and Rare Books 
Library at Emory University is reportedly adopting the term data 
analysis, rather than forensics, with exactly such sensitivities in mind. 
While these concerns are legitimate, we believe that careful donor 
education can allay much of the anxiety around forensic analysis, 
and that in fact many donors may be reassured by the availability of 
this capability.
The benefits of the tools and techniques we have been describing 
are numerous. Incorporating forensics methodology and tools into 
the archival workflow will enable digital archivists and curators to 
capture more information about the content and makeup of digital 
objects; help repositories manage the data copied from disks more ef-
ficiently and in accordance with established standards; reinforce the 
importance of documentation to all aspects of the curation cycle; and 
give archivists, donors, and others the ability to preview the contents 
of both isolated storage media and complete computing systems to 
formulate acquisition and preservation strategies. 
Nonetheless, scholars and archivists may well find themselves 
proceeding from different sets of assumptions and priorities than 
the legal community does, and they will almost certainly find them-
selves working within different sets of constraints. Time is typically 
of the essence in criminal or civil proceedings: the statute of limita-
tions means that an analyst is under pressure to deliver results as 
expeditiously as possible. A legal forensic expert must excel at pack-
aging and presenting a discovery in a manner that will be persua-
sive to the nonspecialist. Ambiguities will be resolved, rather than 
embraced. 
In the legal and law enforcement community, much of the focus 
of a forensic investigation is on the proverbial “smoking gun”—some 
key piece of digital evidence that will seal an indictment, corroborate 
a witness’s testimony, sow doubt in the mind of a juror, bring the op-
position to the bargaining table, and so forth. The major commercial 
forensics software packages reflect what an increasingly competitive 
marketplace demands, with features supporting the automatic ex-
traction of pornographic images, credit card numbers, phone num-
bers, names, dates, or other incriminating file types and data. In the 
archives and cultural heritage communities, however, smoking guns 
are usually red herrings. An archivist may well want to isolate per-
sonally identifiable information so that it can be redacted, but rarely 
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is a single document or image the object of a scholar’s attention. In-
deed, it is not yet clear what kinds of demands scholars will place on 
born-digital material, or what expectations they will have in terms of 
access, analysis, and publication of their findings. One thing, how-
ever, is certain: they are more likely to be interested in wide-ranging 
discovery and exploration. As the size and rate of acquisition for 
personal digital papers continue to accelerate, scholars and patrons 
are likely going to need tools for data mining, social network visual-
ization, and discovery that are subtler and more forgiving than those 
now supported in the commercial sector.
Perhaps the strongest point we can make is to reinforce the 
distinction between tools and procedures. Not every institution or 
repository has the resources to adopt a complete forensic workflow, 
and in many cases commercial software and a full forensic worksta-
tion may exceed the needs of a repository’s collection materials. For 
example, if a repository has only one media type (e.g., Zip disks) in 
its collection and limited resources, investing in a forensic worksta-
tion designed to capture images from a variety of media is not essen-
tial. More important than specific technical skills or a large budget is 
a willingness to figure out what knowledge and tools are necessary 
to get the job done, and how to go about acquiring them. Interoper-
able and extensible tools, procedures, and conceptual frameworks 
are paramount. Technology is expensive, but methodology is free: 
even if a repository does not have the funding or staff resources to 
invest in equipment, it can adopt components of a forensic method-
ology (see the sidebar on a “Digital Forensics Workflow”) and rely 
on freeware or built-in utilities to perform actions such as capture 
and metadata extraction and basic analysis, or to find a way to share 
resources with other repositories in the area doing similar work. Ide-
ally, this report, in conjunction with other resources (see Appendix 
C), will provide enough information about forensic tools and meth-
odologies for archivists and others to make informed choices about 
the components that best suit their collection materials, funding and 
staff resources, and level of institutional support.
While we have focused on file-system forensics as the aspect of 
industry practice most directly relevant to the needs of archivists, 
we would offer a closing word of caution with respect to privileging 
the file as the default unit of forensic analysis or of scholarly atten-
tion. Files, after all, are just logical conveniences, both at the level of 
the computer operating system and user interaction. Files always 
exist within larger contexts, whether they take the form of the lo-
cal file system, an individual user’s complete ecology of machines 
and devices, or the material world around an individual computer, 
whose edges may be as physically proximate yet functionally re-
moved from the digital object as a sticky note mounted on the edge 
of a screen display. At the Maryland symposium, Seamus Ross pro-
vocatively referred to digital forensics as a “discipline of failure,” 
meaning that its raison d’être was to compensate for shortcomings 
in the custodianship of the digital cultural record to date. For Ross, 
forensics seemed to represent the possibility of overcoming limits to 
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knowledge imposed by technological obsolescence, media degrada-
tion, insufficient institutional resources, and simple human error. 
Other symposium attendees felt differently; they pointed out that 
lived human experience is always going to be messy and out of sync 
with seamless mappings to archival structures and workflows. In 
their view, forensics is not compensatory but enabling, representing 
an opportunity for archivists to achieve greater consistency, trans-
parency, and flexibility in their processing of the documents and 
records in their care. We believe that this apparent contrast is in fact 
yet another manifestation of the Janus-faced nature of forensics itself, 
simultaneously retrospective and prescriptive, elegiac and idealistic, 
empirical and rhetorical. Computers and digital media clearly will 
provide new challenges for this age-old mix of tensions and opposi-
tions, but the custodians of the born-digital cultural record can and 
will continue to build on the base of achievement that has come to 
them from diplomatics, archival practice, textual scholarship, and 
scientific method.
4.1. Next Steps
The community represented at the Maryland symposium felt 
strongly that the momentum from the event should not be lost, 
particularly with regard to contacts that had been opened between 
repositories and various federal agencies. We offer the following rec-
ommendations, many of which emerged out of conversations at the 
symposium:
1. Develop policy frameworks and best-practice agreements for 
donor relations, liability, workflows, and researcher access. 
There was a strong collective sense among participants that manu-
script archives need to work together at the administrative level to 
develop policy frameworks for the issues that will define relations 
between donors, collecting institutions, and patrons in the born-
digital era (see the sidebar on “Donor Agreements”). These issues 
include legal and public policy agendas; guidelines for handling 
sensitive or illicit materials that may come into an institution’s 
possession as part of a born-digital collection; liability with regard 
to third-party, personally identifiable information in a collection; 
donor education; shared deeds of gift; and appropriate access con-
trols for different classes of researchers and patrons. 
2. Develop regional networks for collaboration. Not every institu-
tion will be able to support and maintain infrastructure for digital 
forensics, and indeed it is not necessary that identical expertise 
reside at every institution. The development of regional networks 
for sharing knowledge, hard-won experience, and specialized 
hardware or facilities seems essential to the success of the indi-
vidual archivist who is faced with the prospect of processing a 
born-digital collection absent a robustly equipped local environ-
ment for doing so.
3. Define requirements for and develop new tools. As the ar-
chives and cultural heritage community grows increasingly 
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sophisticated in its adoption of forensic procedures, friction will 
likely arise between the features and frameworks of existing 
tools and the needs of this new constituency. Given the realities 
of the marketplace, those needs are unlikely to be addressed by 
commercial vendors. Therefore, open-source development and 
sponsored research in academic settings will be the way forward. 
Existing open-source packages such as Sleuth Kit may provide an 
adequate base from which to build, but requirements will need to 
be scoped and defined. Researchers will also need new tools, es-
pecially those focusing on data mining, visualization, and discov-
ery. The work of the international digital humanities community 
in particular is likely to be a source from which to build, given 
that much expertise and practical experience have already been 
invested in tools for text analysis, text mining, and visualization. 
Finally, creators will require new tools. There is much ground for 
debate as to the appropriateness of early intervention in a cre-
ator’s daily desktop computing habits, but it increasingly seems 
desirable that individuals should be educated about the personal-
archiving tools available to them (Hoppla and Anthologize are 
both promising in this regard).41
4. Aid in articulating a scholarly research agenda. Born-digital 
archives will expand exponentially the query scope of research 
in traditional fields. But what kinds of questions will scholars 
want to ask of this new class of materials, and how can archives 
support those queries and investigations while maintaining their 
obligations to the donor? Informational sessions at professional 
meetings such as those of the Modern Language Association, 
American Historical Association, and Association of Writing 
Professionals represent one outreach path, as do (for a broader 
audience) social media outlets such as YouTube (as has been dem-
onstrated by both Digital Preservation Europe and the Library of 
Congress).42
5. Collect more stories and case studies. More case studies are 
needed to document and examine how forensic methods and 
tools are being integrated into workflows within specific institu-
tional settings. Outcomes will need to be assessed and cost-bene-
fits established. The AIMS project (Virginia, Stanford, Yale, Hull), 
futureArch (Bodleian), and the Digital Records Forensics Project 
(University of British Columbia [UBC]) are all likely sources for 
such case studies, as is the ongoing work under the auspices of 
the Digital Lives project at the British Library.
6. Facilitate training. Corporate training programs such as those 
provided by major industry vendors are likely beyond the reach 
of archivists in all but a handful of settings. Therefore, the cul-
tural heritage community needs to develop its own venues for 
exposure to and training in forensic tools and procedures. The 
41 See http://www.ifs.tuwien.ac.at/dp/hoppla/ and http://anthologize.org/, 
respectively.
42 See, for example, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbBa6Oam7-w and http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=qEmmeFFafUs&feature=channel. 
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School of Information and Library Science at the University of 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill, is undertaking such a pilot program 
(funded by The Mellon Foundation), and its outcomes should be 
followed. The Rare Book School at the University of Virginia has 
recently begun to offer a course entitled “Born-Digital Materials: 
Theory and Practice.” Taught by Matthew Kirschenbaum and 
Naomi Nelson, it includes forensics in the curriculum. Other op-
portunities may become available in the form of workshops at 
conferences and special institutes. The community should work 
together to publicize these opportunities.
7. Encourage cross-publication of research literature and cross-
promotion of professional events. As Duranti (2009) notes, “Dig-
ital forensics experts are still mostly practitioners and the disci-
pline has only recently entered academia; thus it lacks the kind of 
fora offered to theory development by a multiplicity of scholarly 
journals and a well-established community of academics writing 
for them” (43). Duranti recommends the International Journal of 
Digital Evidence, as well as the more recently established Journal 
of Digital Forensics, Security, and Law, for this purpose. Outreach 
to the editorial boards of these journals might yield special issues 
on topics of interest to the cultural heritage community. Likewise, 
the major professional meetings and publication venues in the 
archives community might initiate on a larger scale outreach to 
legal and government practitioners of the kind undertaken for 
the Maryland symposium. The Forensics Wiki, an independently 
curated information-sharing site, is one potential resource for 
coordinating such efforts.43 Efforts for cross-sharing research and 
expertise could also be initiated in conjunction with the regional 
networks for collaboration suggested above, as well as more in-
formally, along the lines of meet-ups, hack fests, and other social-
productivity events commonplace in the open-source world.
8. Pursue terminology mapping. Given the extensive overlap in 
terminology between the forensics, e-discovery, and archival 
communities, some symposium participants felt that a shared 
mapping of terminology would be an essential first step toward 
fostering further contacts between the fields. The Digital Records 
Forensics Project at the University of British Columbia offers an 
example of what such a mapping might look like.
43 Available at http://www.forensicswiki.org/wiki/Main_Page. 
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The bulk of forensics work done in archives and other cultural heri-
tage institutions uses software to read, rebuild, analyze, and secure 
data from acquired storage devices and media—in forensics terms, 
using software to conduct “dead analysis.”  These tools may be bun-
dled in a full-blown forensics package or distributed as individual, 
specialized programs or scripts. They may have graphical user inter-
faces or may require familiarity with command line interactions. The 
functions most relevant to archival work are imaging, data recovery, 
and logging.




Blank Support not advertised
Methodology
The tools in the following tables were primarily discovered through 
syllabi for digital forensics courses, conference literature, the Foren-
sics Wiki, and Wikipedia entries for forensic methodologies. Addi-
tional data were gathered from the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) Computer Forensic Tool Testing Program 
(CFTT), vendor Web sites and other marketing materials, correspon-
dence with vendors, user reviews, and forum posts. 
Disclaimer	
All information is accurate to the best of our knowledge at the time 
of publication. However, digital forensics is a large and complex 
market, and vendors, products, and capabilities change often. These 
tables are merely intended to serve as guides. Under no circumstanc-
es should inclusion of a product or vendor be taken as endorsement, 
nor should exclusion be taken as intentional. Individuals or institu-
tions must assume full responsibility for their own independent 
verification of any information provided herein before using it as the 
basis of a purchasing or policy decision. Under no circumstances can 
the authors, consultants, CLIR, or the Mellon Foundation be held re-
sponsible for purchasing or other decisions made on the basis of the 
information that follows. 
The authors regret any errors or omissions.
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Glossary
Imaging
Imaging is the technique of making a soft copy of an entire storage 
medium (or partition, in the case of hard drives) rather than copying 
individual files. The resulting image can be manipulated in the same 
ways as the original, without the hardware. Images come in two 
general varieties: sparse and bit-exact (sometimes called a clone).  A 
sparse image copies only the sectors that contain data, ignoring any 
zero-byte sectors and thereby resulting in a smaller file. Bit-exact im-
ages contain the entire disk or partition, resulting in a file the same 
size as the original medium’s full capacity. Disk clones can typically 
be restored only to a partition of the same size as the original, while 
sparse images can be restored to any partition large enough to con-
tain the data.
Data Recovery
In addition to imaging, data recovery covers all processes to retrieve 
damaged, deleted, or otherwise hidden data. The broad categories 
of data recovery are rebuilding, in which damaged file systems are 
rebuilt; data carving, which can be used to recover data even in the 
absence of a healthy file system; and steganalysis, or processes to 
find and retrieve hidden data. 
Logging
As with any preservation activity, processes used to recover data 
must be recorded. Because forensics software has been designed for 
legal investigation, many of these programs have robust, automatic 
logging systems.
Other Uses
Many functions outside these core features may also be valuable to 
an archivist. Encryption software can ensure adequate protection for 
sensitive materials, and decryption software may aid in accessing the 
data of donors unable to supply their passwords. Annotation and 
bookmarking abilities can aid in highlighting materials of interest 
or flagging trouble spots. Filtering, search, and (meta)data extrac-
tion have their obvious benefits, and if the item in question is an 
entire computer, it is possible that, in the case of a full-workstation 
donation, RAM and registry analysis could be valuable. Many of the 
packages also offer a range of visualization and time-lining options 
that can aid in understanding the range of materials in a donation. 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































There are four major categories of forensic hardware: write-blockers, 
cryptographic hardware, data copiers, and adapters. 
Write-blockers
Floppy disks were once made with a tab that allowed them to be ac-
cessed in “write-protect mode.” This manual precaution ensured that 
whatever was done with the data by the computer accessing it, the 
original disk would not change.  Optical media and hard drives offer 
no such built-in protections, and including a hardware intermediary 
between the read-device and the computer provides extra assurance 
that the original data are unchanged.
Prices range from $150–$200 for a simple USB adapter or dock to 
$1,000–$2,000 for write-blocked data-duplication devices.
Cryptography devices
Hardware devices exist for both encryption and decryption. Decryp-
tion devices perform brute-force attacks that the user can hook to an 
encrypted device while using his or her workstation for other tasks. 
On the encryption side, hardware offers an extra layer of security (or 
barrier to entry): hardware-encrypted media cannot be decrypted 
without the physical key.
Because of  the extreme processing power required for brute-
force attacks, decryption devices cost between $5,000 and $20,000. A 
USB encryption key may cost as little as $10, while encrypted hard 
drives run between $500 and $1,000.
Data copiers
Data copiers are equipped with bays for drives or media to be copied 
from and to. These devices typically take bit-exact images of what-
ever they are copying, and are often designed with mass copying in 
mind.
Adapters
The number of connectors for internal and external devices is as-
tounding: SCSI, IDE, SATA, SAS, ESDI, Firewire, a dozen varieties 
of USB, and more. Having every type of connection built into a ma-
chine is unlikely, especially when dealing with archival (i.e., likely 
obsolete) materials. In many cases, an adapter is available to convert 
APPENDIX B 
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an acquired drive’s interface into one supported by the user’s system 
(e.g. using a SATA-to-USB cable to read a laptop hard drive with a 
desktop PC).
Adapters may be cables, enclosures, or dongles and range in 
price from $10–$100.
Vendors
In some cases, devices are sold through a vendor but developed by 
a third party; this tends to be true of vendors that stock complete 



























































Digital Intelligence Y Y Y Y Y http://www.digitalintelligence.com/
Forensic Computers Y Y Y Y Y http://www.forensic-computers.com/
Wiebetech (M) Y Y Y Y http://www.wiebetech.com/
CRU Dataport (M) Y Y http://www.cru-dataport.com/
ForensicPC Y Y Y Y Y Y Y http://www.forensicpc.com/
Paraben (M) Y Y http://www.paraben-hardware.com/
Tableau (M) Y Y Y Y Y http://www.tableau.com/
Intelligent Computer Solutions (M) Y Y Y Y Y http://www.ics-iq.com
Voom Technologies (M) Y http://www.voomtech.com
Diskology (M) Y Y Y http://www.diskology.com
CPR Tools (M) Y Y15 Y Y http://www.cprtools.net/
Logicube (M) Y Y Y http://www.logicubeforensics.com
15 CPR’s DriveKey is available only to law enforcement and government agencies.










Processor: Intel i7 920 CPU (quad processor), 2.66 GHz, 8 MB cache, 4.80 GT/s Intel® QPI 
RAM: 6 GB DDR3-1333 triple channel memory
Storage: 1 x 150 GBGB 10,000 RPM 3.0 GbGB/s SATA hard drive in shock-mounted tray 
1 x 1.5 TBTB 7200 RPM 3.0 GbGB/s SATA hard drive in shock-mounted tray
Internal Drives: BD-R/BD-RE/DVD ± RW/CD ± RW Blu-ray burner dual-layer combo drive 
Digital Intelligence Integrated Forensic media card reader
External Drives: USB 3-1/2” floppy drive with write-protect switch
Port/Slots: 6 ports (6 drives) primary 3.0 GbGB/s serial ATA (SATA) controller (RAID 
capable) 
2 ports (2 drives) SAS-serial attached SCSI controller (RAID capable) 
2 ports eSATA 150/300 SATA On-the-GO (RAID capable) 
1 port (2 drives) DMA 66/100/133 parallel ATA (IDE) controller 
1 PS/2 combo port (keyboard & mouse) 
11 USB 2.0/1.x ports: 8 back mounted, 3 front mounted (1 write blocked) 
2 FireWire IEEE 1394a (400 MB/s) ports: 2 back mounted 
3 FireWire IEEE 1394b (800 MB/s) ports: 1 back mounted, 2 front mounted (1 
write blocked) 
2 x PCI-Express (x16), 1 x PCI-Express (x1), 2xPCI-X, 1xPCI(2.2) slots
Software: MS-DOS 6.22 (pre-installed & configured) 
Microsoft Windows 98SE Standalone DOS (pre-installed & configured/installed 
& configured) 
Microsoft Windows XP Pro (pre-installed & configured/installed & configured) 
Suse Linux Professional (preconfigured/configured) 
Norton GHOST 
Nero DVD/CD authoring software 
DriveSpy, Image, PDWipe, PDBlock, PART
Cables: All the necessary cables, adapters, and terminators to image and process 
internal/external SCSI drives, 1.8-inch IDE (iPod) drives, 2.5-inch IDE (laptop) 
drives, and 3½-½ and 5¼-¼inch IDE drives.
Bays: 2 x Native shock mounted SATA removable hard drive bays (IDE capable) 
3 x HotSwap shock mounted universal (IDE/SATA compatible) removable hard 
drive bays
Accessories: Extendable/retractable imaging workshelf/retractable imaging workshelf with 
integrated ventilation 
Security screwdriver set integrated ventilation 
Security screwdriver set






Processor: Intel® Pentium D 940 3.2-GHz, 2X2 L2 cache, LGA 775 
RAM: 4 GB DDR2 PC2-5300 DDR2-667 
Storage: 150 GB VelociRaptor SATA II hard drive 
500 GB SATA II hard drive
Internal Drives: 1.44 floppy drive 
22X DVD-RW drive 
16X DVD-ROM /40X CD-ROM
External Drives:  
Port/Slots: 1 open PCI-X slot; 3 open PCI slots 
1 front mounted and 1 back mounted FireWire 400 port 
1 front mounted and 2 back mounted FireWire 800 ports 
4 front mounted and 3 back mounted USB 2.0 ports 
1 back mounted eSATA port
Software: Microsoft Windows XP Professional 
QuickView Plus Version 10
Cables:  
Bays: Tableau T35i Forensic SATA/IDE Bridge with a DC Out Molex port, a SATA 
port, and an IDE port. 
One CRU DataPort V Plus SATA removable storage module (READ/WRITE )  
(Hot-Swappable). Also includes a CRU DataPort V IDE to SATA tray. 






Processor: Intel Core 2 Duo E7400 2.8 GHz 1066 MHz
RAM: 2 GB DDR2
Storage: (2) 500 GB SATA drives (rpm unspecified)
Internal Drives: Dual layer DVD writer
External Drives:  
Port/Slots: Write-blocked multi-format memory card reader
Software:  
Cables:  
Bays: Forensic Drive Bay Controller with multibay read/write status 
Shock-mounted SATA and IDE write-blocked bays
Accessories: Accessory drawer with adapter storage
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APPENDIX C 
W e have taken a deliberately broad and catholic view of what constitutes “further resources,” aiming for diversity of perspective as much as or more than completeness 
of coverage. Thus, textbooks and technical reports on digital foren-
sics appear alongside works examining evidence, information, and 
archives across human history. We hope readers find this siting of 
digital forensics within a broader context useful, even as the listings 
provide solid guidance for further study for the serious practitioner. 
We have not included any entries for articles; we refer readers 
instead to the section on journals offering coverage of the relevant 
fields. Cal Lee’s bibliographies also offer excellent starting points, 
and are available at http://ils.unc.edu/callee/emanuscripts-stew-
ardship/related-resources.html.  
Commercial and open source software and hardware are covered 
in Appendixes A and B, respectively.
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A n integral part of the proposal for the research and writing of this report was an invitational symposium on Computer Forensics and Cultural Heritage, held May 14–15, 2010, and 
hosted by the Maryland Institute for Technology in the Humanities 
(MITH) on the campus of the University of Maryland in College 
Park—a location designed to exploit the concentration of govern-
ment and industry expertise in the surrounding area. Some 60 indi-
viduals, representing archives, information and library science, com-
puter science, the forensics industry, government agencies, and the 
world of scholarship, attended the meeting. To the best of our knowl-
edge, it was the first large-scale meeting ever to be convened on the 
convergence of digital forensics and cultural heritage. The meeting 
served the dual purposes of allowing for comment on a draft version 
of this report, and providing a catalyst for contact between person-
nel from these otherwise seemingly disparate fields, with the aim of 
leading to more regular occasions for knowledge exchange and the 
development of shared research agendas. A Web site used in support 
of the meeting, including a complete list of attendees, is available at 
http://mith.info/forensics/. 
Day one of the event was devoted to formal presentations clus-
tered around such rubrics as perspectives, education, fieldwork, and 
government practices. The program was designed to accommodate 
both broad-reaching theoretical statements and detailed reports from 
those already engaged in hands-on work with forensics methods 
and tools. Speakers included Luciana Duranti (University of British 
Columbia), William Eber (Department of Defense Cybercrime Cen-
ter), Stephen Eniss (Folger Shakespeare Library), Amy Friedlander 
(Journal on Computing and Cultural Heritage), Patricia Galloway (Uni-
versity of Texas), Simson Garfinkel (Naval Postgraduate School), 
Brad Glisson (University of Glasgow), Barbara Gutmann (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology), Peter Hornsby (Emory Uni-
versity), Jeremy Leighton John (British Library), Leslie Johnston (Na-
tional Digital Information Infrastructure and Preservation Program 
[NDIIPP]), Cal Lee (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), 
Clifford Lynch (Coalition for Networked Information), Rob Maxwell 
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(University of Maryland), Michael Olson (Stanford University), Sea-
mus Ross (University of Toronto), Leo Scanlon (National Archives), 
and Susan Thomas (Bodleian Libraries). Each session included ample 
time for questions and discussion from the audience. The agenda 
also included an hour for lightning talks, for which participants were 
able to sign up at the meeting site. These constituted eight additional 
presentations.
 Day two opened with an hour-long presentation of the draft 
report by coauthors Matthew Kirschenbaum, Richard Ovenden, and 
Gabriela Redwine. (The draft had also been previously circulated to 
selected attendees.) The meeting then divided into breakout groups 
facilitated by each of the three coauthors, which allowed for an 
hour of focused and candid feedback. Many attendees also passed 
annotated electronic or hard copy of the report to the authors with 
additional notes and suggestions. The meeting concluded with a 
wrap-up session devoted to summarizing conclusions and articulat-
ing an agenda for next steps. (This discussion heavily informed the 
conclusions and recommendations in this report.) The authors spent 
the remainder of the second day in conference with Duranti, Glisson, 
Lee, Maxwell, Reside, and Thomas, assessing the impact of the meet-
ing and developing a revision strategy for the report.
Audio from both days of the proceedings was captured and used 
by the authors as a reference in the course of their revisions.
Slides and audio from a number of the first day’s presentations, 
available at http://mith.info/forensics/?page_id=120, complement 
the material covered in these pages.  (The slides and audio are also 
accessible as “Presentations” from the main site link above.)
Clifford Lynch discussed the symposium in the May 2010 edition 
of the podcast CNI Conversations. The event was also written up for 
the Library of Congress’s NDIIPP blog.1 Twitter traffic is available 
under the hashtag #4n6umd.
The authors regard the meeting as an invaluable opportunity to 
survey representatives from relevant communities on issues covered 
in the report and to obtain their feedback on matters both general 
and particular. This report should not, however, be taken to repre-
sent a strict consensus among the attendees at the meeting, nor do 
the authors seek to place the burden of errors or misstatements on 
any persons but themselves.
  
1 See http://news.cni.org/2010/06/02/cni-conversations-may-recording-available/ 
and http://www.digitalpreservation.gov/news/2010/20100610news_article_
forensics_meeting.html, respectively.
